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Executive Summary 
This report examines the establishment of the first regional justice and 
security hub near Gbarnga, Liberia. By building up law enforcement 
and justice capacities in the outlying regions, the hub represents a joint 
effort by the Government of Liberia and the UN Peacebuilding Fund to 
extend Liberian state authority. The context for this pilot initiative is 
that Liberian police and justice services have a weak presence outside 
the capital city of Monrovia and will increasingly bear sole 
responsibility for safety and security as the UN Mission in Liberia draws 
down its forces with a view to eventual withdrawal.  
Forward-basing of PSU at the Gbarnga hub has brought benefits to 
the region – faster armed response to public order incidents and 
increased visibility of police in the outlying regions through outreach 
activities linked to confidence patrols. These benefits nevertheless 
remain limited by resource constraints, in particular the lack of 
adequate means of transportation. While co-location has enabled the 
lending of vehicles by the BPU to the PSU on occasion, this does not 
resolve the fundamental problem of a critical gap in their means of 
mobility. Under-resourcing is even more severe for regular LNP located 
at depots throughout the three counties, and the imposition of user 
‘fees’ or petty corruption is rife. Public perceptions in the Gbarnga 
region seemed generally sympathetic to the police, with a seemingly 
broad understanding that regular LNP are not paid enough to cover 
basic living costs, nor receive the resources to perform their 
professional functions as they are supposed to. Low pay and various 
professional disincentives further dissuade LNP from accepting 
deployment to the leeward, while better conditions in the elite PSU and 
ERU units attract qualified regular LNP. While the hub has raised rapid 
response policing capacity and extended the state’s authority through 
the PSU, systemic budgeting shortfalls forms the backdrop and sets 
narrow boundaries not only to those achievements, but to the ability of 
regular LNP working at depots throughout the three counties to 
perform their functions. 
The hub offers several benefits for building Liberia’s border 
management capacities, namely improving response times for security 
incident response at the border through forward deployment, providing 
dormitory accommodation for the BPU officers, and enabling the 
sharing of the BPU’s two vehicles with other hub-based units, and in 
particular the PSU when required. Nevertheless, the stationing of the 
BPU at the hub reduces but does not fully resolve the problem of 
distance and logistics; the BPUs at the Gbarnga hub remain centralised 
inland from the border, rather than being dispersed in close proximity 
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to the border. Original planning for the Gbarnga hub expected that BPU 
at the hub would benefit from co-location with other law enforcement 
officers at the hub through enabling information and intelligence 
sharing. This argument for co-locating the BPU with PSU and other 
services at the hub appears weak in the current context when weighed 
against the advantages of improving service delivery – surveillance 
patrolling and security incident response – through locating BPUs 
closer to the border. More benefits would appear to be offered through 
co-location at the border itself. Future hubs will not likely host BPU, 
which will be located closer to or at the border. 
The court complex was not yet complete and few justice-related 
services were being provided from the hub when field research was 
undertaken. However concerns were raised about the distance of the 
Gbarnga hub from Gbarnga city, and the logistical difficulties that 
would be posed for those needing to appear at the magisterial and 
circuit courts as well as for other justice and security providers who 
would interact with the courts, including the Gbarnga regional prison 
and regular LNP. While building formal justice capacity is urgently 
needed, it is also clear that these efforts will be constrained by the 
systemic dysfunctions that continue to afflict the formal justice system. 
Under-staffed, under-resourced, with excessively short court terms, 
resulting in overloaded court dockets, huge backlogs of cases and very 
low number of cases being heard, the formal justice process is slow and 
expensive for those pursuing cases through the courts, and its 
vulnerability to corruption favours those who are able to pay. Given 
these conditions, it is to be expected that the majority of Liberians will 
continue to resort to customary or traditional justice when possible.  
Although it is offsite from the hub, the Gbarnga prison is connected 
to the justice and security services located there. The prison is viewed 
as well-run and having improved conditions for prisoners. Several 
improvements seem to be linked to the hub initiative as well as good 
management. Insufficient court capacity and backlogs in the criminal 
justice process have produced a very high rate of pre-trial detention in 
Liberia, applying to around 78% of prison inmates. Nevertheless, this 
situation has improved in the Gbarnga prison, seemingly as a result of 
the introduction of fast-track court proceedings to release suspects 
whose pre-trial detention time has exceeded the legal limit. The decline 
may also be due to the introduction of probation for minor and first 
time offences. The hub initiative has also resulted in the building of a 
new medical clinic at the Gbarnga prison, a very positive development 
in view of the lack of adequate transportation to transfer ill inmates to 
hospital. Nevertheless, a continuing risk is posed by the lack of 
transportation for detainees between court and the prison, whether the 
court is based in Gbarnga city, or eventually in the hub. 
In terms of improving justice and security for women and children, 
the Gbarnga hub hosts the regional office of the Sexual and Gender 
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Based Violence (SGBV) Crime Unit, part of the prosecution arm of the 
Ministry of Justice. The unit works closely with the LNP’s WACPS and 
prosecutors, and also seeks to provide psycho-social support to victims 
of sexual violence. While its location at the hub will facilitate 
coordination with prosecutors and other justice personnel involved in 
the prosecution of SGBV cases, the SGBV Crime Unit must also venture 
outside the hub to collect information about SGBV incidents to build 
cases for prosecution. Although reliant on having adequate logistical 
capacity, the unit’s one vehicle was not functioning at the time of 
research. While various NGOs and UNMIL contingents have helped fill 
logistical gaps in the past, these avenues of assistance are declining 
with UNMIL drawdown. Although not based at the hub, regular LNP 
who have been trained to handle SGVV cases and work in the 
specialised WACPS units are closely linked to the activities and 
effectiveness of hub actors seeking to improve women and children’s 
justice and security. WACPS officers face challenges through a high 
departure rate linked to low pay and better professional prospects in 
the PSU and ERU.  
Whether co-location of key justice and security providers at the 
Gbarnga hub will enhance collaboration to improve service delivery 
remains to be proven. Centralising services in a highly under-served 
region may bring more disadvantages than benefits, particularly when 
the extremely challenging issue of logistics are considered, for both 
clients and providers of justice and security services. The hub has 
achieved some deconcentration of justice and security personnel from 
Monrovia and a somewhat stronger physical presence of the Liberian 
state in the leeward, but deeper decentralisation appears to be some 
ways off. While complaints now are easier to register for the public, the 
mechanism does not necessarily have any bearing on whether 
accountability mechanisms for justice and security actors are 
considered effective. Impact of the hub on local community groups and 
NGOs is not yet evident, and more needs to be done in publicising the 
functions and services offered at the hub. 
Planning for future hubs should incorporate the lessons learned 
from the Gbarnga hub. This appears to have been the case in the new 
prioritisation of service delivery in subsequent hubs. Just as important, 
future hubs should reflect the needs and priorities of local communities 
as well as local justice and security service providers. Baseline 
perception surveys should be undertaken well in advance of planning, 
which should involve truly inclusive processes. Regular monitoring 
and impact assessment should be undertaken as all planned services 
begin operating from the hub, particularly in terms of the effects of co-
location. Further, in view of the de facto coexistence of both formal and 
traditional/customary justice providers, more effort to coordinate and 
harmonise state building efforts related to the future hubs with 
traditional/customary justice providers could be undertaken. Finally, 
work on future hubs must be undertaken in tandem with efforts to 
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address the resource gaps, lack of capacity, bottlenecks and 
vulnerability to corruption in the formal justice and security system, 
and to do so in a way that is sustainable with long-term commitment of 
government funding. 
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 I. Context 
This report examines a recent effort to improve the delivery of critical 
public goods to outlying communities in Liberia. Due to lingering 
devastation wrought by the extended 14-year civil war and a historical 
tendency to concentrate state resources and infrastructure in the 
capital city of Monrovia at the expense of the hinterland, delivery of 
public services to Liberia’s outlying regions or ‘leeward’ is deficient, 
and in many places practically non-existent. This weakness in public 
service delivery is particularly the case with state policing and criminal 
justice, two of the most fundamental and defining functions of the 
modern state.  
The project examined here, a joint initiative by the Government of 
Liberia and the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), seeks to 
build up the capacity of Liberian state actors to provide public security 
and improve access to justice for people living in outlying areas 
through the creation of regional ‘justice and security hubs’. The 
gradual drawdown and eventual withdrawal of the UN Peacekeeping 
Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) has served as a trigger for the build-up of 
state justice and security services. The development of policing 
capacities is aimed at enabling the Liberian state to assume full 
responsibility for internal security tasks hitherto performed by UNMIL. 
The hub initiative acknowledges the close link between state police and 
the formal justice system, and reflects the understanding that efforts to 
increase state policing capacities must necessarily also address 
relevant actors and mechanisms in the justice sector in order to be 
effective. The hub initiative has emphasised the enhancement of 
service delivery to communities outside the centre through the 
‘decentralisation’ of personnel and assets from Monrovia and a move 
towards greater inclusiveness and accountability in public service 
delivery for Liberians who live in under-served regions.   
Field research was undertaken in June 2013 in Gbarnga (Bong 
County) and in Monrovia. Interviews were conducted in Monrovia with 
relevant UN and Government of Liberia officials, and in Gbarnga and its 
environs with hub personnel, local justice and security providers, 
UNMIL personnel, representatives of Gbarnga area community groups 
and civil society organisations, and with inhabitants of several 
communities surrounding the hub. Semi-structured interviews were 
conducted to gather information, perceptions and expectations of 
stakeholders and local actors. As the hub was only partially completed 
at the time of the field research and the hub was not yet fully 
functional, this report will concentrate primarily on those services that 
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were being delivered at the time of our visit – i.e. the delivery of public 
safety (security) and maintenance of order. 
In this report, I will first present the background and context of the 
effort to improve state-delivered justice and security services in Liberia. 
I will then examine findings of the field research concerning the 
Gbarnga hub. I conclude with an assessment as to whether the Gbarnga 
hub is meeting its intended objectives, and recommendations for future 
efforts in extension of state authority and improvement of justice and 
security in Liberia. 
Background  
Liberia is a post-conflict state still recovering from 14 years of civil war 
that occurred in two phases, the first from 1989 until 1996, and the 
second from 1999 to 2003. As a result of the conflict, an estimated 
250,000 people had been killed and nearly one million displaced out of 
a pre-war population of nearly three million. Many women and 
children were conscripted into militias, and rape occurred widely 
during the war, against civilians and combatants. The extended 
conflict shattered the economy and infrastructure of Liberia, and ended 
most governmental activities and public services.1  
Following the August 2003 Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA), a National Transitional Government of Liberia was appointed 
until democratic elections were held in October 2005 and Ellen 
Johnson Sirleaf was elected President, then re-elected in 2011. Sirleaf 
has presided over the reconstruction and state-building process, 
facilitated by a large international presence. The UN Mission in Liberia 
(UNMIL) was established in October 2003, absorbing the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) peacekeeping force that 
had preceded it, and at one point constituted the largest UN 
peacekeeping mission to be deployed with an authorized force of 
15,000 military personnel and 1,115 police officers. UNMIL has played 
a major role in Liberia’s post-war stabilization and reconstruction, but 
today UNMIL is undergoing a transition in which it is drawing down its 
forces and progressively handing over security tasks hitherto 
performed by its uniformed personnel to local authorities.2 Between 
2007 and 2010 UNMIL reduced from 15,000 to 7,952 troops (of which 
1,375 were police).3 In 2012 the UN Security Council decided to reduce 
military strength further to 3,750 troops by July 2015, though 
                                                          
1  Republic of Liberia Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Volume I: Preliminary 
Findings and Recommendations, 2009.  
2  United Nations Security Council Resolution 2066 (2012).  
3  UNSCR 2066 (2012), para 5. See also UNMIL page on UN website, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmil/facts.shtml, last accessed 
10 May 2014.  
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augmenting the mission by additional UN police including 3 additional 
Formed Police Units (FPUs) to assist with the transition.4 Current total 
authorised strength of the police contingent is 1,795, consisting of up 
to 10 FPUs and UN Police (UNPOL) advisers.5  
A major challenge to transition and the building of Liberian state 
capacity to provide public security is that Liberia remains one of the 
world’s poorest countries; in 2012, 83.8% of its people fell below the 
international poverty line of having an income at or above USD 
$1.25/per day.6 Liberia continues to have a highly centralised state, 
and corruption is pervasive to the extent that Liberia is considered one 
of the most corrupt states according to global corruption rankings.7 
And yet there are signs of improvement. The country is generally 
stable, although recent unrest in neighbouring Guinea and Côte 
d’Ivoire has had some reverberations especially in the border region. 
And while Liberia ranks below average in Africa and in the West 
African sub-region in terms of governance indicators, Liberia was 
recently named as the African state that had experienced the most 
improvement in overall governance since 2000, with its biggest 
improvement in the area of public safety and rule of law.8  
State Security and Justice Provision in Liberia 
Law Enforcement and Public Security 
The key state actors and institutions responsible for delivering justice 
and security throughout the country have undergone significant efforts 
to restructure and build capacity since the end of the civil war. The 
Liberian police faced daunting challenges in the immediate post-war 
period in terms of both personnel and resources. When UNMIL arrived 
in 2003, they found few Liberian police remaining in their positions, 
and of those who were still working, many lacked basic qualifications 
or were believed to be linked to rebel groups. To create the new Liberia 
National Police (LNP), all existing police were deactivated and were 
allowed to apply to join the new police, undergo vetting, and if 
accepted, undergo basic training. Out of almost 3,000 police officers 
who had registered to join the new police, only 756 remained after 
                                                          
4  UNSCR 2066 (2012) and Jennifer Lazuta, ‘UN takes next steps in drawdown of 
military presence in Liberia’, Voice of America News (online), 15 January 2013.  
5  UNSCR 2066 (2012). 
6  World Bank, ‘World Development Indicators 2012’, Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
http://data.worldbank.org. http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-
development-indicators. Last accessed 10 May 2014 
7  Transparency International, Global Corruption Barometer 2013, ‘Liberia’.  
8  Mo Ibrahim Foundation, ‘Liberia “most improved” in Ibrahim Index of African 
Governance’, Press Release, 14 October 2013.  
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undergoing vetting.9 The initial vetting procedure aimed to identify and 
disqualify those who were over 55 years of age, had failed to meet the 
minimum educational qualifications, or were found to have committed 
human rights abuses.10 The vetting procedure was criticized on various 
and sometimes contradictory grounds. Many police were angered by 
the requirement that all officers who wanted to continue working for 
the new LNP had to re-apply for their positions, as they felt their 
experience was not valued. At the same time civil society actors 
criticised the vetting process for failing to be conducted with sufficient 
rigour, or enabling individuals with questionable human rights records 
to return to the police despite having been vetted.11 Other critics 
maintained that the vetting procedure removed too many experienced 
police and left it bereft of knowledgeable police personnel, and allowed 
recruitment of individuals who did not meet the minimum conditions, 
especially in terms of education.12 With insufficient numbers of police 
for the size of the country (see below), a shortage of middle-
management expertise, low morale internally among the poorly paid 
recruits, and continued lack of public confidence as a legacy of the war 
years and the perceived flaws in the vetting procedure, the LNP in the 
immediate post-war years were unable to adequately ensure public 
security or maintain public order.  
In this context UNMIL’s military and police contingents, Formed 
Police Units, have been based at locations throughout Liberia to 
provide support to the LNP and Bureau of Immigration and 
Naturalization (BIN), which have lacked the capacity to contend with 
public disorder involving ten or more persons.13 They have also made a 
significant contribution to strengthening public perceptions of security 
in the country through their presence and patrols since 2003. For 
                                                          
9  Jonathan (Yoni) Friedman and Christine MacAuley, ‘Building Civilian Police 
Capacity: Post-Conflict Liberia, 2003-2011’, Innovations for Successful Societies, 
Princeton University, 2011, 
http://www.princeton.edu/successfulsocieties/content/focusareas/PL/policynote
s/view.xml?id=176. Last accessed 5 May 2014. 
10  Friedman and MacAuley, 2011. See also Bruce Baker, ‘A policing partnership for 
post-war Africa? Lessons from Liberia and southern Sudan’, Policing and Society, 
Vol. 19, Issue 4 (2009), p. 375.  
11  Mark Malan, Security Sector Reform in Liberia: Mixed Results from Humble 
Beginnings (Carlisle, Penn: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 
2008), 50-51.   
12  Thembani Mbadlanyana and Freedom C. Onuoha, ‘Peacekeeping and Post-Conflict 
Criminality: Challenges to the (re)establishment of rule of law in Liberia’, ISS Paper 
190, (June 2009), p. 14. International Crisis Group, ‘Liberia: Uneven Progress in 
Security Sector Reform’, Africa Report No. 148 (13 January 2009), p. 17.  
13  Peacebuilding Fund, ‘Quick Start for Liberia Priority Plan II (2011-13), 12 November 
2010. Available at: 
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/documents/projects/LBR/00061292_P
BF%20Quick_Start_Project.pdf, last accessed 5 May 2014. 
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example, 94% of respondents in a 2006 survey stated that the security 
situation had improved under UNMIL.14 A more recent survey 
published in 2010 found that 93% of respondents felt more secure 
through the physical presence of UNMIL contingents compared to the 
time before they had arrived, and that UNMIL enjoyed a high level of 
legitimacy as a security provider among Liberians living in 
communities where UNMIL forces were deployed, with 65% seeing 
UNMIL as the primary security provider against armed groups.15  
While the United States assumed the lead for Liberia’s armed forces 
reform, Liberian police reform was led by UNMIL. Part of UNMIL’s 
original mandate was monitoring and restructuring the Liberian police, 
helping to develop a civilian police training programme, and assisting 
in training the civilian police.16 Since 2003 United Nations Police 
(UNPOL) serving in UNMIL has directly contributed to the rebuilding of 
the Liberian National Police. UNPOL advisers provide advice and 
mentoring to LNP and BIN officers through co-location with 
counterparts and by providing training at the National Police Training 
Academy. UNPOL contingents have filled public security gaps through 
their presence and patrols. FPUs are armed police units who are tasked 
with public order management, protection of UN personnel and 
facilities, and assist with higher-risk police operations.17 In Liberia, in 
addition to conducting joint patrols with LNP, and providing 
operational support to the LNP when necessary during instances of 
public disorder, FPUs have engaged in community outreach activities 
to help build public confidence in police.18  
The LNP does not yet have a comprehensive and effective presence 
throughout Liberia. In January 2013, LNP strength was reported at 
4,200 officers, translating into a police/citizen ratio of 1: 683.19 By 
February 2014, police strength stood at 4,573 officers, and there was a 
severe backlog of over 1,000 police recruits awaiting basic training at 
                                                          
14  Jean Krasno, Public Opinion Survey of UNMIL’s Work in Liberia (New York: UN 
Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, March 2006), p. 5.  
15  Eric Mvukiyehe and Cyrus Samii, ‘Quantitative Impact Evaluation of the United 
Nations Mission in Liberia: Final Report’, 9 February 2010, pp. 11-12. 
16  UN Security Council, Resolution 1509 (2003), para 3 (n).  
17  Annika S. Hansen, ‘Policing the Peace: The Rise of United Nations Formed Police 
Units’, ZIF Policy Briefing, May 2011.  
18  UNMIL webpage, 
http://unmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3959&language=en-US. Last 
accessed 10 May 2014.  
19  World Bank and UNMIL, ‘Liberia Public Expenditure Review Note: Meeting the 
Challenges of the UNMIL Security Transition’, Report No. 71009-LR, January 2013,’ 
January 2013. 
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the police training academy.20 Current strength remains well under the 
8,000 estimated to be necessary to properly maintain public security 
for the current Liberian population of over 4 million once the UN 
Mission in Liberia draws down and withdraws its military and police 
contingents.21 This figure is based on a United Nations guideline that 
recommends on average one police officer per every 450 citizens. 
Various considerations may influence that ratio, however, such as the 
country’s road network, geography, policing model, mobility and 
communications capacity, crime rate, fiscal conditions and informal 
policing mechanisms. In Liberia, where the road network is poor and 
police have extremely limited mobility and communications, an 
estimated police-to-citizen ratio of 1:500 is considered a minimum.22 
Figures from a 2010 study indicate that Bong County, with some 102 
LNP personnel dispersed across ten police stations or posts, had a 
police-to-citizen ratio of 1: 3300.23  
LNP in the outlying regions (also referred to as ‘up country’ or ‘the 
leeward’) are severely under-resourced and face operational and 
logistical challenges. Perhaps the most significant challenge to the 
ability of the LNP to carry out its duties is its lack of sufficient vehicles 
and mobility, which given the challenging terrain of Liberia, 
particularly in the rainy season, seriously constrains the capacity of the 
police to respond promptly and effectively to crime and disorder. As 
previous studies have found, in addition to vehicles, LNP in the 
periphery also lack radio communications, electricity, equipment and 
basic office supplies.24  
The low numbers of police in the countryside and their inadequate 
means of mobility is a fundamental gap in police capacity which 
weakens the claims of the state to be the legitimate provider of security 
and public order. Self-organised policing initiatives, such as 
neighbourhood watch groups and village/community patrols have 
emerged in the absence of effective state policing presence and high 
crime rates. Although these local initiatives can be positive phenomena 
there is also potential for abuses.25 Further, frequent incidents of mob 
                                                          
20  UN Security Council, ‘Twenty-seventh progress report of the Secretary-General on 
the United Nations Mission in Liberia’, S/2014/123, 18 February 2014, para 41.   
21  Estimate of required police in Liberia cited by UNDP representative in Winston 
Parley, ‘UNDP Worries on Security’, The New Dawn (Monrovia), 24 June 2013. The 
latest population figure for Liberia is 4.1 million in 2012, provided by the World 
Bank. See:  http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL 
22  World Bank and UNMIL, ‘Liberia Public Expenditure Review Note’, p. 9.  
23  Richard Reeve with Jackson Speare, Security and Justice from a County Perspective: 
Bong County, Liberia, International Alert (November 2010), p. 14.  
24  Baker, p. 375.  
25  Ana Kantor and Mariam Persson, Understanding Vigilantism: Informal Security 
Providers and Security Sector Reform in Liberia, Folke Berndotte Academy, pp. 21-
29.  
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violence and vigilante justice in Liberia demonstrate that local police 
are not trusted to provide community safety and order to local 
inhabitants. Growing frequency of mob violence spurred UNMIL to 
embark in 2014 on a year-long public awareness campaign against 
mob violence.26 Weak police presence, slow response due to lack of 
mobility, and problems of the wider criminal justice system reinforce 
popular perceptions that police allow criminals to walk free. 
Regular LNP officers – until very recently – have been unarmed.27 
To deal more effectively with serious organised violence and civil 
disorder, two specialised units within the LNP were established that 
both carry arms. The Emergency Response Unit (ERU), numbering over 
312 officers,28 is composed of elite Special Weapons and Tactics 
(SWAT) teams that are highly trained, heavily armed and mandated to 
use lethal force in order to deal with organised armed threats. The ERU 
have been primarily funded, equipped and trained by the United 
States. At the time of field research in June 2013, ERU were deployed 
close to the border with Cote d’Ivoire along with Armed Forces of 
Liberia (AFL) and BIN personnel in response to recent instability and 
cross-border incidents.  
The other armed police unit in the LNP is the Police Support Unit 
(PSU), a standby force that provides a rapid, armed response to regular 
LNP requests for assistance in instances of civil unrest and breakdown 
of public order. PSU provide backup, support and crowd control, 
usually in response to small incidents of disorder, such as unruly 
demonstrations, as well as in cases of riots and civil unrest. PSU 
officers receive six months of training in riot policing and hostage 
situations to this end. By February 2014 the PSU had achieved 
personnel strength of 1005 officers.29 Until the Gbarnga hub was 
established, all PSU were deployed from Monrovia to respond to LNP 
requests for assistance throughout the country. 
                                                          
26  A 44% increase in incidents of mob violence in Liberia was reported from January to 
September 2013. See 
http://unmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=5521&language=en-US, last 
accessed 10 May 2014.  
27  In April 2014, in reaction to the continuing inability of police to respond to crime at 
night and increasing incidents of mob violence directed at police, Director of Police 
Chris Massaquoi announced the decision to arm police at every police station in 
every district of Liberia. See Winston W. Parley, ‘Liberia: Police to be Armed at 
Depots’, The New Dawn (Monrovia), 9 April 2014, on AllAfrica.com.  
28  Figure from UNMIL website. 
http://unmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3959&language=en-US, last 
accessed 10 May 2014.  
29  UN Security Council, ‘Twenty-seventh progress report of the Secretary-
General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia’, S/2014/123, 18 
February 2014, para 41. 
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Border Management 
Liberia has a 1,500 kilometre long ‘green’ (land) border that includes 
176 border entry points, including an estimated 130 unofficial crossing 
points. The three counties served by the Gbarnga hub – Lofa, Bong and 
Nimba – all have external land border control responsibilities, sharing 
borders with Sierra Leone, Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire. Border posts are 
few and far between, typically have poor infrastructure and lack 
electricity, and are understaffed by border management personnel. In 
2010, for example, Lofa County had 90 Bureau of Immigration and 
Naturalization (BIN) officers to serve 18 official border posts in addition 
to two key internal highway checkpoints, and dozens of unofficial 
border crossings. The county lacked any armed Liberian security 
personnel, and in the event of security threats, had to rely either on 
ERU to be deployed from Monrovia, which was about a 9 hour drive to 
Voinjama (in dry weather conditions), or on UNMIL military, FPU and 
police contingents.30  
Border management appears to be lagging behind other areas of 
security sector reform in Liberia. As of January 2013 BIN personnel 
numbered fewer than 2000 officers, and reportedly among those ‘many 
are not qualified and some are eligible for retirement.’31 Strengthening 
that capacity is essential in the context of UNMIL drawdown and 
reduced patrols, increasing Liberia’s vulnerability to smuggling and 
cross-border theft, as well as intermittent periods of volatility and 
instability in neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea. To that end, BIN 
has set out a target of increasing its personnel strength to 3500 by 
2017, and of fully arming its Border Patrol Unit.32 While Liberia 
continues to lack state capacity to effectively manage its external 
borders, there have been some improvements: in 2012 security 
personnel were stationed at only 36 official border crossings 
throughout Liberia; by 2014 this has been increased to 45 manned 
border crossings. The BIN has the declared aim of manning 15 
additional border crossings each year.33  
Justice System  
Liberia’s formal justice system contains severe capacity gaps in the 
form of insufficient prosecutors, public defenders, judges, and 
overloaded court dockets that contribute to the very slow progression 
of court cases through the formal justice system. Investigators and 
                                                          
30  Reeve with Speare, ‘Lofa County’, p. 14.  
31  World Bank and UN Mission in Liberia, ‘Liberia Public Expenditure Review 
Note’, p. 9.  
32  ‘250 BIN Recruits Begin Training Today’ in New Liberia, 7 August 2013.  
33  Henry Karno, ‘National Security Gets US $86M As Justice Minister Leads 
Defense of Budget’, Front Page, Africaonline, 10 August 2012; and Alvin 
Worzi, ‘BIN Commissioner Visits Lofa’s Borders’, Daily Observer 
(Monrovia), 15 April 2014.  
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prosecutors face resource constraints in following up cases, conducting 
proper investigations, and mounting effective prosecutions, especially 
in remote areas. Poor road conditions, communications and 
coordination impair the use of witnesses during hearings34. There are 
often long delays before a case will come before a judge, if ever. 
Suspects are typically detained for long periods before appearing 
before a judge; in 2013 an estimated 80% of Liberia’s prison 
population was awaiting trial.35 This saw a slight improvement by 
2014 when 75% of the prison population was in pre-trial detention.36 
The 130 day limit on how long a suspect can be held in pre-trial is 
frequently exceeded, with the result that suspects often spend 2-3 
years in detention.37  
For the high proportion of impoverished Liberians residing in rural 
areas, the absence of legal aid and the imposition of fees for the 
registering of court cases and for their progress through the justice 
system, constitute significant disincentives to using the formal justice 
system. The justice system is also considered highly vulnerable to 
corruption, and many cases are dropped either by police or at the 
magisterial court level through bribing of officials by alleged 
perpetrators.38 
While this report focuses on the Liberian state’s effort to extend state 
justice and security services, it is essential to recall the prominence of 
the traditional sector for the majority of the population, and the de 
facto hybrid nature of justice and security. In Liberia, as is the case in 
many sub-Saharan African countries, traditional, customary and 
informal justice providers are the predominant and preferred route for 
the resolution of disputes in most rural communities. Customary 
authorities may include the hierarchy of chiefs, elders, and religious 
leaders. Traditional authorities in some areas also include the secret 
societies – Poro and Sande, as well as Masons for the rich and 
powerful.39 Customary and traditional justice mechanisms are, 
compared to the formal justice system, faster, more affordable for the 
                                                          
34  Government of Liberia and UN Joint Programme on Sexual and Gender Based 
Violence, In-depth Study on Reasons for High Incidence of Sexual and Gender 
Based Violence in Liberia: Recommendations on Prevention and Response, October 
2011, p. 52.  
35  Amnesty International, ‘Liberia’, Annual Report 2013, 23 May 2013.  
36  Karin Lundgren, SRSG and Co-ordinator of UN Operations in Liberia, Briefing to the 
Security Council, 20 March 2014. 
37  Ricci Shryock, ‘Prisoners in Liberia often wait years before seeing a courtroom’, 
VOA News, 21 September 2010.  
38  Government of Liberia and UN, ‘In-depth Study’, p. 52.  
39  Deborah Isser, Stephen Lubkemann, Saah N’Tow, Looking for Justice: Liberian 
Experiences with and Perceptions of Local Justice Options, Peaceworks No. 63 
(USIP, 2009).  
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average citizen, and more relevant to the social and cultural contexts of 
many Liberian communities. Their drawbacks are linked to the 
traditional values that reflect a highly patriarchal system, and which 
tend to treat victims of sexual and gender based violence according to 
rigid traditional gender norms.40  
Security and Justice for Women and Children 
Liberian women and children face particular security and justice 
challenges. Sexual and gender-based violence occurred widely during 
the civil war; many women and children were conscripted into militias, 
and rape was widespread against both civilians and combatants.41 
Sexual and gender-based violence continues at an elevated rate in 
contemporary Liberia.42 Yet, relatively few perpetrators are brought to 
justice and face trial in the formal criminal justice system. A substantial 
number of SGBV cases – over one-third of reported SGBV cases in 2010 
– are not forwarded by the LNP to magisterial or circuit court, whether 
due to the resource challenges of investigating and prosecuting such 
crimes, inability of victims to pay fees to access the criminal justice 
system, logistical constraints on witness notification and travel, poor 
record keeping and lack of coordination between elements in the 
criminal justice sector, or corruption.43  
In April, the Monrovia WACPS investigated 143 cases, of which 25 
went to court and 64 cases were withdrawn.44 According to a recent 
public survey, the overwhelming majority of rape cases in the Gbarnga 
region are believed to be carried out someone in close proximity to the 
victim – that is by people believed to be a friend of the family living in 
the community (36.8%), immediate relatives staying in the same house 
as the victim (21%), family members living in the community (16%) or 
                                                          
40  Government of Liberia and UN, ‘In-depth Study’, pp. 51-52.  
41  A survey conducted in 1998 found that 49% of Liberian women and girls reported 
experiencing at least one incident of physical or sexual violence by a combatant. 
See Shana Swiss et al, ‘Violence Against Women in the Liberian Civil Conflict’, The 
Journal of the American Medical Association, Letter from Monrovia, Vol. 279, No. 8 
(1998): 625-629. A more comprehensive 2008 sampling survey that addressed the 
prevalence of sexual violence during the war found that 33% of respondents had 
spent time as combatants, and 33% of those were female. Of the 33% female 
former combatants, most had experienced sexual violence. See Kirsten Johnsen, et 
al, ‘Association of Combatant Status and Sexual Violence with Health and Mental 
Health Outcomes in Postconflict Liberia’, The Journal of the American Medical 
Association, Vol. 300, No. 6 (2008), 676-690.  
42  Small Arms Survey, ‘Peace without Security: Violence against Women and Girls in 
Liberia’, Issue Brief, No. 3 (September 2012), p. 5.  
43  Government of Liberia and UN, ‘In-depth Study’, p. 52.  
44  nterview with Alieu M. Bility, Unit Officer, Women and Children Protection Service, 
Liberia National Police Headquarters, Monrovia, 18 June 2013 
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the father (8%).45 The same study found that family members are often 
not willing to testify when a rape case goes to court because the 
accused is a family member, to avoid shaming the family, and to 
protect the victim from stigma and shame.46  
The Liberian state has accepted that both customary and formal 
justice are part of the Liberian justice system, and is attempting to send 
a clear message to customary justice providers such as town chiefs that 
cases of SGBV are criminal matters that are beyond their jurisdiction 
and that must be dealt with by the LNP and formal justice system. 
However, the reality of life in Liberia is that there are multiple factors 
that continue to lead people to prefer the customary system and to 
avoid pursuing cases in the formal system.  As established in the 
baseline study, there is a very high level of ignorance about the formal 
justice system. There is also an issue of victims not having information 
about the legal process. People in the outlying areas also tend to view 
immediate police actions, such as investigation, arrest and pre-trial 
detention of a suspect, as a form of justice.   
As discussed above, many victims lack the resources necessary to 
see a court case through to its end in the formal justice system, and 
especially in the countryside, victims are counselled to eventually 
accept some form of restorative justice as mediated through the 
community (NGOs, community based organisations, local women’s 
groups). Due to the long processing times and the financial challenges 
of seeing a court case through, many victims and victims’ families 
cannot afford the costs (of transportation, fees, etc.), time or the 
emotional strain, especially when children are involved, to pursue the 
case in the formal justice system. A victim may also be offered 
reparations by the perpetrator or his family, and if she accepts such 
compensation would drop the charges against the accused.  
The ‘Justice and Security Hubs’ initiative 
The hub concept evolved from a proposal originally advanced by the 
Liberian National Police to develop regional command centres as 
forward operating bases in the countryside. In late 2010 the United 
Nations and the Government of Liberia decided to establish five 
regional hubs, each responsible for three counties, which would host 
an array of actors in the justice and security sectors. The development 
of the hubs would be undertaken with the objective of pursuing a 
‘balanced strengthening’ of institutions in each sector – law 
                                                          
45  Search for Common Ground for the SGBV Crimes Unit, Baseline Study on Sexual 
and Gender-Based Violence Indicators in Bong, Lofa and Nimba Counties, Ministry 
of Justice, August 2012, pp. 1-3.  
46  Search for Common Ground, Baseline Study on Sexual and Gender-Based Violence 
Indicators, p. 2.  
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enforcement, the courts, state prosecution and defence, and 
corrections – both in terms of capacity and infrastructure.47 The hubs 
would be aimed at enhancing the provision of justice and security 
through a decentralised and holistic service delivery approach, 
including ‘the enhancement of linkages between these institutions; 
and the development of relationships between the institutions and the 
communities they serve.’48 The hubs would also serve as a means by 
which national agencies could better provide effective security in 
preparation for UNMIL’s transition and the progressive transfer of 
security functions to national authorities.   
The establishment of five regional justice and security hubs 
throughout Liberia is being undertaken with the financial support of 
the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and the assistance of the UN 
Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO). Each hub was projected to cost 
around US $3 million for infrastructure, and an additional $1 million to 
‘enhance services, deployment and outreach’.49 The Peacebuilding 
Fund agreed to provide US $13.3 million for all five hubs, financing the 
first hub in Gbarnga and seeking co-financing from donors for the 
remaining four hubs. As noted in February 2013 by Judy Cheng-
Hopkins, the United Nations Assistant Secretary General for 
Peacebuilding, the PBF’s support to the hubs initiative, has been the 
most ambitious project undertaken by the Fund so far.50  
Gbarnga Justice and Security Hub  
The location of the pilot hub was identified as Gbarnga, the capital of 
Bong County. The Gbarnga hub is supposed to serve the populations of 
the three contiguous counties of Bong, Lofa and Nimba, which in the 
last census from 2008 had a combined population of over one million 
people out of a Liberian total 3.5 million, and which collectively 
encompass a territory spanning 31,779 square kilometres, or nearly 
one-third of Liberia’s total area. The selection of Gbarnga as the 
location for the pilot hub was a strategic decision, as the three counties 
affected are considered ‘conflict prone’.51 The three counties also share 
borders with the states of Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea and Sierra Leone. 
Because of the region’s size and proximity to zones of instability, the 
hub in Gbarnga was determined to have the potential to make a more 
significant and immediate impact on security and justice delivery for 
more people than hubs in other regions.  
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49  World Bank and UNMIL, ‘Liberia Public Expenditure Review Note’.  
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The Gbarnga hub is located five kilometres from the city of Gbarnga, 
which had a population of over 34,000 according to the 2008 census. 
An unpaved road links the hub with Gbarnga city. The hub is being 
constructed on an 18-acre plot of land that was provided by the 
Government of Liberia. The hub will host a magisterial court, circuit 
court, Police Support Unit, Sexual and Gender-Based Violence Crimes 
Unit, Border Protection Unit of the Border and Immigration Service, 
Probation Officers, corrections officers having court-related 
responsibilities, human rights monitors and a Public Outreach Office. 
The infrastructure includes a courthouse complex with housing for 
judges, an administrative building, women’s and men’s dormitories for 
officers of the PSU, dormitories for the BPU officers, a PSU training 
centre, and offices for the SGBV Crime Unit, a Public Outreach Office, 
and a probation service. Gbarnga prison is located off-site, two 
kilometres from the hub on the same road leading into the city. 
Ten services were operating from the Gbarnga hub at the time of 
field interviews in June 2013, out of a planned total of fourteen when 
the hub becomes fully operational. Some services are supposed to be 
based at the hub itself, such as the Public Outreach Office and its 
mechanism for receiving complaints about justice and security actors 
and referring them on to relevant mechanisms and bodies. Other 
services that will eventually be offered at the hub will revolve around 
the courthouse that will be built in the hub, including the judges, 
prosecutors and public defenders. Some court-related services will 
involve service delivery to end users outside the hub, such as those 
involving case officers, probation services and the SGBV Crime Unit, 
comprised of lawyers, victim support officers and people trained to 
investigate SGBV cases but not including regular LNP. The SGBV Crime 
Unit provides services in coordination with a local hospital and makes 
referrals to community-based organisations. There are also services 
that are expected to operate from the hub, that is, with personnel and 
offices and housing being based at the hub but with personnel going 
into the community to provide the service. These include the PSU, 
which provide backup for local police stations throughout the three 
counties, and BPU which conduct surveillance patrols at the borders.  
The construction of the first hub was initiated in 2010, with the 
objective that it would become operational by July 2012. However, 
construction encountered repeated delays and problems, and by early 
2013 the cost of the not yet completed hub had risen to $5.3 million.52 
While the Gbarnga hub was formally opened in February 2013, the 
infrastructure was not yet complete nor was the hub fully operational 
when field research for this study was undertaken in mid-2013. At that 
time, construction of the courthouse, some dormitories and the 
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perimeter fence were yet to be completed.53Most justice-related 
services were not yet operating from the hub. 
Five Hypotheses Underlying the Gbarnga Hub 
According to the Justice and Security Joint Programme Managers at the 
Ministry of Justice, five working hypotheses underpinned the original 
concept of the justice and security hubs in the Liberian Peacebuilding 
Programme.54 These hypotheses apply to the pilot hub built in 
Gbarnga, although it was noted that they could be revised for the 
subsequent hubs. First, and most ambitiously, it was expected that co-
locating justice and security personnel in the hub would enhance 
collaboration and coordination to provide better services. Further, by 
being deployed in one central location, economies of scale could be 
achieved through the sharing or rationalisation of certain resources.55  
The second hypothesis held that the hub would facilitate the 
decentralisation of justice and security services from Monrovia to the 
leeward regions, initially by sending more people out to the region to 
provide these services. Since independence, Liberia has had a highly 
centralised state. Decentralisation is a stated objective of the current 
government. The National Decentralization Policy (NDP) was approved 
in late 2009 by President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and her cabinet, 
released in June 2011, and launched in January 2012. The NDP aims to 
achieve political, administrative and fiscal decentralisation. Conceived 
after nation-wide consultations, and acknowledging the serious 
capacity gaps at both national and local levels, the decentralisation 
process began with the allocation of resources from the national budget 
to county administrations to implement local development policies, 
and with line ministries in Monrovia beginning to deconcentrate 
functions through the transfer of personnel from Monrovia to the 
outlying regions.56 The pilot hub was thus intended to contribute to 
Liberia’s long-term goal of decentralising public service delivery 
through the extension of state justice and security personnel into the 
hub’s area of responsibility, i.e., Bong, Lofa and Nimba counties. 
The third hypothesis held that that the hub – its infrastructure, 
personnel and service delivery – would strengthen the physical 
presence of the Liberian state in the outlying regions, and through that 
                                                          
53  Interview with J. Hezekiah Slakor, Manager of Gbarnga Regional Justice and 
Security Hub, 19 June 2013.  
54  Interview with Paula Barragan and Joyce Cassell-Frankfort, National Program 
Managers, Justice and Security Joint Program, Ministry of Justice, Monrovia, 17 June 
2013.  
55  Keane, p. 88.  
56  Government of Liberia and UNDP, LDLD News on Decentralization & Local 
Development, Vol. 3, No. 1 (January 2012).  
Marina Caparini 
 
24 
presence would help to create safety and security in  the country as 
UNMIL undergoes transition and draws down its military contingents. 
Fourthly, the hub was developed on the assumption that the 
accountability of justice and security providers would improve if the 
hub made it easier for the public to register complaints. Accordingly, 
the hub would contain a public outreach office where complaints 
against justice and security providers could be received and referred on 
to the relevant agency for processing by the appropriate agency 
mechanism. The Gbargna hub would include a referral mechanism 
which is intended to function as a sort of neutral messenger and 
facilitating actor between the member of the public who has lodged the 
complaint on the one hand, and on the other hand the relevant agency 
and its mechanism for processing complaints. 
The fifth hypothesis underlying the hub concept was that the hub 
would strengthen broader links between justice and security actors 
operating from it and community-based services. The focus here would 
be on making coordination between state actors and local community 
groups and NGOs more effective, and ideally, moving towards a 
community-driven approach to justice services.  
These hypotheses will be revisited in the conclusion section. The 
next section will examine findings from the field research on the 
impact that the Gbarnga hub is making in public order, community 
safety, and ensuring access to justice.  
 
 II.  Research Findings 
Law Enforcement and Public Security 
The regional justice and security hubs initiative has as one of its 
primary goals to improve the delivery of justice and stability for 
inhabitants throughout the country, including remote areas.57 Policing 
is central to this vision. One clear contribution of the hub in extending 
state policing authority and capacities is that it has enabled the 
forward deployment at the hub of Police Support Units, quick-response 
armed units that deploy on request by the regular Liberian National 
Police (LNP). Regular LNP are not based out of the Gbarnga hub but are 
stationed at the regional LNP command in Gbarnga city and in small 
depots or stations across the three counties in the region. 
Initially, LNP planning foresaw the basing of a company (120) of 
PSU personnel in each of the five regions in Liberia.58 At the time of 
research in June 2013, 51 PSU officers were deployed at the Gbarnga 
hub to respond to requests for assistance from regular police in Bong, 
Lofa and Nimba, the three counties covered by the hub. The total 
number of PSU officers in Liberia in mid-June 2013 was around 766, 
increasing shortly afterward to 890 with the graduation of 124 officers 
in mid-July.  
Prior to the Gbarnga hub being built, all PSU were based in and 
deployed from Monrovia. As regular LNP have until recently been 
unarmed, that meant that it could take anywhere from half a day up to 
several days before an armed rapid response could deploy to where 
serious public order incidents were taking place in the countryside. The 
forward-basing of PSU at the hub was thus intended to both increase 
police presence and reduce police response time because of the 
shortened distance to respond to incidents in the three counties 
comprising the region, improving operational reach and effectiveness 
of the police.  
Mobility is integral to the functioning of the PSU as a rapid response 
unit. While the forward-basing of PSU at the Gbarnga hub is a 
significant achievement resulting from the hub initiative, the 
effectiveness of the PSU is nevertheless constrained by the lack of 
adequate means of transportation. At the time that the field research 
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was undertaken, the PSU had at its disposal one older vehicle with a 
capacity to carry 10 personnel. The PSU have had to adapt to this 
constraint on their mobility. An LNP request for back-up assistance that 
requires a sizeable PSU response may involve successive trips by the 
one vehicle to transport the needed number of PSU officers. In one 
instance when a riot was occurring in neighbouring county, the PSU 
lacked transportation and had to wait for vehicles to be sent from 
Monrovia. In other instances the PSU have borrowed a vehicle, 
specifically from the Border Patrol Unit (BPU), which is also based at 
the Gbarnga hub and has two vehicles at its disposal. Thus while ability 
to deploy has improved by basing PSU at the hub, problems remain as 
a result of limited resources. The hub has also presented the 
opportunity, in a context of extreme resource constraints, for resource-
sharing with other co-located agencies at the hub. In the case of other 
serious incidents, the PSU has requested assistance from UNMIL in 
transporting its officers to the scene. However the possibility of UN 
assistance will decline as patrols are curtailed and military contingents 
are drawn down.  
According to the PSU regional commander, by mid-2013 requests 
for Gbarnga hub-based PSU backup to incidents of public disorder 
occured on average between zero and five times a month. It is 
acknowledged by those involved in the planning and development of 
the hub initiative that leaving the 51 PSU officers sitting in the hub 
when they are not responding to backup calls would result in their 
underutilisation and likely erode their discipline, morale and 
cohesion.59 PSU based at the Gbarnga hub have thus also been tasked 
with conducting ‘confidence patrols’. These confidence patrols are 
intended to counter negative perceptions of the police that are rooted 
in wartime experiences, reduce fear and build citizen confidence in the 
police by engaging with local communities. When on confidence 
patrols, a PSU team will seek out the local town chief and community 
leaders, visiting the palaver hut, church or mosque, as well as the 
market, where they speak to local people, using officers who speak the 
local dialects. While creating more of a visible police presence in the 
region, these patrols are believed to also serve as a deterrent to crime. 
The confidence patrols take place three times each month in local 
communities in each of the three counties, with each patrol lasting 3-5 
days.60  
The PSU represent a tangible and visible assertion of state authority 
to deliver security to local communities. In a context of continuing 
weak regular LNP presence in the outlying areas, the PSU is 
pragmatically used to boost visibility of police and build trust through 
regular confidence patrols. We found that the PSU did not, however, 
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undertake confidence patrols with regular LNP based in the localities 
they visited, and that this perhaps constituted a missed opportunity to 
further raise the profile of the LNP and develop closer working 
relationships between regular LNP and PSU.  
One of the most striking findings that emerged from the field 
research was the generally positive attitude that we encountered 
towards the police among people we interviewed in and around 
Gbarnga. The research team did not have the time or resources to 
conduct a representative public opinion survey, and consequently our 
findings are indicative rather than representative. However, from both 
our formal interviews and casual discussions with people in Gbarnga 
and surrounding communities, members of civil society organisations, 
and individuals working for and with the Liberian justice sector more 
broadly and with the UN, we formed a different perspective of the LNP 
than what has sometimes been portrayed. We generally found that a 
number of our respondents expressed trust in police, and also an 
understanding of the extreme lack of adequate resources that affect 
both the working and living conditions of the LNP. We heard from one 
civil society representative that peoples’ attitude towards the police 
had changed since the war. ‘People know they can go to the police now 
if they need to.’ Similarly, a journalist in Gbarnga noted that seeing the 
police making confidence patrols (PSU) ‘makes people feel safe’.  
Our findings are also echoed in a 2012 baseline survey which 
indicated a somewhat low but overall degree of satisfaction in Bong, 
Lofa and Nimba counties with the level of personal and community 
safety: 62% of respondents felt their community was secure or very 
secure, and 65% of respondents felt personally safe or very safe. While 
only 52% of respondents felt that the Liberia National Police and Police 
Support Units were capable of responding to security threats, a 
somewhat higher percentage, 62%, expressed some dissatisfaction 
with how quickly police responded to crime in their community. 64% 
of respondents reported that they had to pay fees for police to 
investigate crimes in their community. Yet 67% found that the 
relationship between security personnel and civilians to be good or 
very good, and 20% found the relationship to be fair. These findings 
can be interpreted as being broadly consistent with the findings of yet 
another survey, as reported in the 2011 UN Rule of Law Indicators 
Report.61 According to that report, 76.9% of Liberian respondents 
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agree fully or in part that the police do as much as they can to be of 
service to the community.62 
Notwithstanding the generally positive view of police by the 
Liberian public, there is a fundamental capacity and resources problem 
that continues to afflict the police. One of the main problems, 
acknowledged by all whom we interviewed, is the lack of adequate 
budgetary resources for the police. Our field research confirmed that 
the LNP regional headquarter and various depots located in and 
around Gbarnga continue to lack vehicles, radio communications, 
electricity, equipment and basic office supplies. Lack of funding affects 
the ability of LNP to perform basic law enforcement functions. 
Regular LNP, but also the better-trained and more mobile PSU, 
remain severely under-resourced, and lack sufficient vehicles, and 
therefore mobility and capacity to effectively perform their duties. As 
noted by the LNP Inspector General, ‘…the Liberia National Police, by 
the very nature of our work require continuous adequate and 
appropriate logistics to effectively carry out our job. There are cries all 
over the country by our people for the presence of police in their areas, 
but for the police to be where they should be when they should be 
requires logistics and more logistics. We are not crying ‘wolf’ as some 
may think. The police have genuine need of logistics, including 
communication, vehicles, uniforms, as well as infrastructure to be able 
to do the people’s business of providing security.’63 
Indeed, the challenges for LNP in the leeward are daunting. The 
regular LNP are dispersed in police stations or depots in the major 
towns and villages across the three counties, including the regional 
LNP HQ at Gbarnga city. The LNP presence is neither high in numbers 
nor well distributed throughout the region. A 2010 study established 
that there were merely 102 regular LNP officers, including 7 female 
LNP, dispersed in 10 police posts in Bong County that year. For a 
county population of around 329,000, that translated into a police-to-
civilian ratio of 1: 3,300.64 In Nimba County, a similar ratio of about 1: 
3,300 applied for 128 LNP deployed to police a population of 462,000 
in 2008.65 In Lofa, with a population of 270,000, there were 158 LNP 
                                                          
62  Liberia Peacebuilding Office, ‘Report on Baseline Public Perception Survey’, 
October 2012, p. 13.  
63  Chris Massaquoi, Director, Liberia National Police, in Joint Press Conference by 
Liberia National Police and UNPOL, 16 January 2013. Available at: 
http://unmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?ctl=Details&tabid=3982&mid=6800&It
emID=900246, last accessed 10 May 2014. 
64  Richard Reeve with Jackson Speare, ‘Security and Justice from a County 
Perspective: Bong County, Liberia’, International Alert, November 2010, p. 14.  
65  LNP figure from Republic of Liberia, Nimba County Development Agenda, 2008-
2012, p. 13. Population figure is from the 2008 census. See also Richard Reeve and 
Extending State Authority in Liberia: The Gbarnga Justice and Securrity Hub 29 
including 18 female officers deployed in 2010, for a police-to-citizen 
ration of 1: 1,700.66   
Police stations throughout the leeward, but especially in the regions 
most affected by the fighting during the civil war, which include Lofa 
and Bong, were often completely destroyed. Although a number have 
been rebuilt or renovated through UN Quick Impact Project funding, 
many lack the most basic amenities, and LNP have no means of 
transportation. LNP salaries are also low and officers have difficulty 
meeting their basic living expenses, contributing to petty corruption. 
This was acknowledged by the LNP’s then Deputy Police Director for 
Administration when she noted in 2013 that a patrol officer’s basic 
salary stands at around USD $150, which is insufficient to cover basic 
living expenses, monthly rent for an officer’s family typically running 
to $75 per month (and with a standard down payment for 
accommodation of 6-12 months’ rent), school fees for their children, 
and food. As she noted, ‘You hear a lot of reports about corruption – 
corruption in the police. We are saying that there is situation that is 
created for some of us, which makes it easy for some of us to do 
things…that are not pleasant.’67  
It is worth noting that Deputy Director Stryker came under heavy 
criticism for these remarks, and her efforts to explain why the practice 
of imposing ‘fees’ was pervasive and occurring at the level of basic 
patrol officers was portrayed in media accounts as an act of condoning 
police corruption. This criticism was revived in the wake of two NGO 
reports that highlighted the ubiquity of petty corruption among 
Liberian police. Transparency International’s Global Corruption 
Barometer, issued in July 2013, placed concern about corruption in 
Liberia at 4.8 (on a scale between 1 and 5), with 77% of respondents 
reporting that they or someone in their household had paid a bribe to 
the police in the last 12 months (the figure of reported bribery in the 
judiciary was similarly 77%). In the same survey, 95% of respondents 
felt that the police were corrupt or extremely corrupt.68 This was 
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followed shortly after by a report by Human Rights Watch, which 
issued a report condemning pervasive police corruption in Liberia.69  
As discussed above, Liberia’s police are low in numbers for the 
population, and concentrated in Monrovia. The pay of regular LNP is 
insufficient to meet basic living needs; however their financial 
situation becomes even more tenuous when they are sent on rotation to 
the leeward regions. Liberia is one of the few countries in West Africa 
that does not yet have a comprehensive system of police barracks or 
housing allowances to offset the costs for police officers who are 
deployed away from their homes and families, and LNP officers are 
expected to be on regular rotation. LNP deployed upcountry are thus 
responsible themselves for finding and paying for their new living 
quarters. For officers who have families, they must find new 
accommodation while continuing to support their families, who they 
often cannot afford to bring with them.  
In addition to the added financial challenges of a rural posting, 
there are other disincentives relating to restricted professional 
opportunities that dissuade regular LNP officers from readily accepting 
deployment in the leeward. This includes reduced or no opportunities 
for in-service training, workshops, remedial services, and other forms 
of professional development that exist in Monrovia. Thus, although 
Liberia maintains a policy of rotation of police officers to the rural areas 
such as Gbarnga, many officers do not want to deploy to the leeward 
regions because of the above factors, perpetuating the systemic under-
representation of police outside of Monrovia. 
PSU and ERU officers enjoy better conditions compared to regular 
LNP.70 Both PSU and ERU officers have a higher salary than regular 
LNP officers. The Gbarnga hub provides accommodation and food for 
PSU officers. Members of the PSU and ERU are recruited from within 
the LNP, and candidates must have two years of service in the LNP 
before applying. Because the PSU and ERU are better trained, better 
paid (ERU being the best paid), the officers of these specialised elite 
units have more opportunities for professional development, and are 
better equipped and have higher level of prestige. We heard that these 
are strong incentives for regular police to seek to join these elite units, 
creating a further drain on regular LNP. However, as mentioned, even 
though better paid than regular LNP, PSU officers also suffer 
constraints due to lack of budgetary resources in terms of limited 
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logistical capacities, an absence of food and lodging allowances when 
out on multi-day confidence patrols, limited equipment and 
infrastructure at the hub, etc.71  
The consistent under-resourcing of the LNP helps to explain why 
LNP officers, who are poorly paid, and who lack the minimal resources 
to function in their professional capacity, impose ‘fees’ on members of 
the public and otherwise engage in what may be considered petty 
corruption. The chronic under-resourcing of the LNP feeds petty 
corruption as police seek to pass on the costs of conducting basic police 
work to those who require their assistance -- the victims of crime. 
Without police vehicles, regular police must pay a motorbike or car taxi 
to take them to investigate crime scenes or transport suspects with 
money out of their own pockets, or they must find some other means to 
cover the cost of motorbike taxis and car taxis. Transport favours from 
motorists may also be solicited. Without the mobility that is provided 
having sufficient vehicles, and lacking forensics and other basic 
capacities and equipment, police officers cannot effectively investigate 
crimes, collect evidence, and follow up on cases. As mentioned above, 
UNMIL military and police contingents will less and less be a source of 
transportation for regular LNP as the mission curtails patrols and draws 
down in the transition.  
Under-resourcing of the police budget has effects on the most 
mundane of tasks necessary for the police to carry out their duties. For 
example, without a photocopier, and lacking budgetary funds to pay 
for commercial photocopies of files required for court proceedings, 
police must similarly either pay for photocopies out of their own 
pockets, or find some other means, i.e. charging fees to the victims. 
These ‘fees’ may in some circumstances be opportunistic, but it was 
evident to the research team that if no budgetary funds were available, 
imposing user fees would be the only means of carrying out the 
activity. While fees charged by individual police officers are often 
categorised by Western observers as ‘soliciting bribes’ or petty 
corruption, these are not only a means of making up for very low 
salaries of regular police, which are under even more strain in the 
leeward because of the lack of housing or a housing allowance, but 
because the police often simply lack the basic resources required to do 
their work.  
The source of the constraints facing the Liberian police, particularly 
in the leeward, is inadequate resources budgeted for the security and 
justice sectors by the central government in Monrovia. While 
Government of Liberia spending on policing in 2012-13 amounted to 
US $19.9 million, this was decreased 18% in the 2013-14 budget to 
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$16.4 million.72 In September 2013 the UN’s Special Representative for 
Liberia sounded a public warning that Liberia was not increasing the 
presence of security forces or improving their operational effectiveness 
sufficiently to take over from UN peacekeeping forces as they draw 
down. The Special Representative specifically criticised Liberia for 
reducing budgetary allocations for police significantly from the 
preceding year, and for failing to train new police fast enough, with 
only 99 officers graduating from the Police Academy in 2012 despite 
the earlier expansion of the Police Academy to train 600 per year. A 
further 148 police recruits were delayed a year in graduating due to 
budget constraints.73 In response to the SRSG’s warning, the President 
and the Minister of Finance immediately promised that efforts would be 
made to provide sufficient resources for the justice and security sectors 
in the coming fiscal year, specifically through the introduction of a 
supplemental budget. The Government of Liberia announced that it 
would contribute US $1 million for the second and third regional hubs 
in addition to ensuring coverage of recurrent costs.74  
Funding shortfalls, complicated budgetary mechanisms and weak 
financial management skills within the LNP have further contributed to 
problems in enabling the disbursement of budgetary funds to the 
policing sector. In early 2014, the Minister of Finance undertook to 
ease procedures for disbursement of policing-related funding.75 Thus, 
while the hub has raised policing capacity and extended the state’s 
authority through the PSU, systemic budgeting shortfalls forms the 
backdrop and sets narrow boundaries to those achievements, and 
remain a serious constraint on the functioning of regular LNP already 
in place at depots throughout the counties.   
Border Management 
At the time of field research in June 2013, the Gbarnga hub hosted 45 
Border Patrol Unit (BPU) officers, to be deployed as backup for regular 
Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization (BIN) officers based at the 
border in Bong, Lofa and Nimba counties, to conduct surveillance 
patrols at the border and to respond to border security incidents. The 
Gbarnga hub-based BPU reportedly sends patrols to each county border 
region two or three times per month, with each border patrol visit 
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lasting several days.76 The hub contains a dormitory for the BPU 
officers, and the BPU has two pickup trucks that are located at the hub.  
The hub offers several benefits for building Liberia’s border 
management capacities. First, basing BPU at the Gbarnga hub could be 
reasonably expected to improve the response times for security 
incident response in the region, since BPU units deploying from the 
Gbarnga hub are closer to the country’s northern border than if they 
were deployed from Monrovia as previously had been the case. Second, 
the hub provides dormitory accommodation for the BPU officers. BIN 
officers are in the same position as LNP officers in the leeward in that 
Liberia does not generally provide accommodation for them in the 
countryside, posing significant financial and practical challenges for 
officers. The third advantage posed by the hub is the opportunity it 
presents to share the BPU’s two vehicles with other hub-based units, 
and in particular the PSU when PSU vehicles are insufficient or one has 
broken down. Given the extreme logistical challenges posed by lack of 
mobility afflicting all security and justice providers in the leeward, this 
ability to share transportation resources is important.  
Nevertheless, the stationing of the BPU at the hub reduces but does 
not fully resolve the problem of distance and logistics; the BPUs at the 
Gbarnga hub remain centralised inland from the border, rather than 
being dispersed in close proximity to the border. The poor condition of 
Liberia’s roads and the extremely challenging terrain in the border 
region, much of which runs through dense tropical forest, poses 
significant challenges to border management. The two pickup trucks 
allocated to the BPU at Gbarnga are a critical resource but are 
insufficient. As most of the roads in the border region are not accessible 
by car, there is also more need of motorcycles for border patrols.77 
Continuing limitations on mobility posed by insufficient vehicles for 
border and law enforcement officials raises the question of why the 
BPU were located at the hub rather than closer to the border. 
According to original planning for the Gbarnga hub, basing BPU at 
the hub would benefit from co-location with other law enforcement 
officers at the hub. ‘Co-locating BIN Regional Commanders with their 
LNP counterparts will enable information and intelligence to be quickly 
shared in relation to the general security situation and particular 
incidents in their area of responsibility.’78 This argument for co-
locating the BPU with PSU and other services at the hub appears weak 
in the current context when weighed against the advantages of 
improving service delivery – surveillance patrolling and security 
incident response – through locating BPUs closer to the border.  
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Co-location in the context of border management actually does exist 
at some key border posts that host multiple agencies that work closely 
together and may conduct joint operations. For example, the LNP and 
customs work in the same office as the BIN, and conduct joint 
operations at a major border crossing on the border between Sierra 
Leone and Liberia. The research team also heard that there are plans to 
establish a network of community policing meetings along the border, 
involving BIN and LNP officers from Liberia, BIN and gendarmerie from 
Côte d’Ivoire, and civil society from both sides of the border.79 Thus 
potential benefits in terms of sharing of information, improved 
coordination and improved service delivery as a result of co-location of 
border personnel with other law enforcement personnel would appear 
more evident at the border itself, than at the hub. 
Notwithstanding the advantages of faster response time, 
accommodation for BPU and the opportunity to pool transportation 
resources, it appears that the Gbargna hub is understood as not 
offering a model to emulate insofar as border management is 
concerned, since planning for subsequent hubs will not host BPU 
officers, who will rather be based in offices along the border.80  
Access to justice 
One of the key priorities of the justice and security hub initiative is to 
strengthen the capacity of formal justice sector institutions and 
enhance access to justice throughout the region. According to original 
plans from 2010, this would be achieved in two ways. First, the hub 
project would increase the regional presence of judicial and 
prosecutorial personnel, including state prosecutors (county 
attorneys), prosecutors, public defenders and judges. At the time that 
the hub project was first approved, there was only one legally qualified 
county attorney and one legally qualified state-provided defence 
counsel per county. Second, access to justice would be improved by 
strengthening justice sector infrastructure, specifically through the 
construction of both a two-room county circuit court and a county 
magistrate court at the hub, as well as by making improvements to the 
Gbarnga corrections facility, located 2 km away from the hub on the 
road to Gbarnga town.81 Beyond the construction of new courts at the 
hub, and increasing the number of county attorneys and public 
defenders working at them, there would also be enhanced delivery to 
the areas beyond the hubs through the employment of mobile courts 
that would travel regularly to smaller cities and towns to resolve minor 
disputes, provide legal advice to pre-trial detainees in correctional 
facilities, and provide other services. Further, it was envisioned that 
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legal aid desks would be established at the hub to provide legal advice 
and referrals to NGOs that provide various services, such as 
transportation, shelter, and representation.82  
At the time of our field research, the courthouse complex was still 
under construction at the hub and few justice-related services had yet 
moved to the hub. The location of the courts at the hub is intended to 
facilitate the interaction of justice and security personnel, and we were 
informed that once the new magisterial and circuit courts were 
constructed, the judges, county attorneys, public defenders and 
prosecutors would all be based at the hub, as would probation service 
personnel. Judges would also have their residential quarters at the 
hub.83 During construction of the Gbarnga hub, seven magisterial 
courts operated in Bong County (two in Gbarnga city), and one circuit 
court (also in Gbarnga city). The county prosecutor continued to be 
based in Gbarnga city as well. In anticipation of the increased case load 
resulting from the increased police (PSU) presence in the region, the 
creation of new magisterial courts was planned, and additional staff 
would be provided in the form of one additional public defender and 
one additional public prosecutor. In increasing police capacity and 
magisterial courts, it was expected that there would also be a 
corresponding increase in demand for services provided by the circuit 
court (the court of second instance), hence there was an acknowledged 
need to increase the capacity of the circuit court for the region.84    
Although the core justice services had not yet begun to be delivered 
from the hub at the time of our field visit, some preliminary 
observations were possible. The advantages to relocating the circuit 
court at the hub appeared ambiguous to many people we interviewed. 
This is largely linked to the logistical challenges for those who must use 
the court services. Once the circuit court begins operating from the 
hub, people from the three counties will be required to travel to the hub 
rather than to Gbarnga city, posing added logistical challenges. The 
accessibility of the hub was an issue of concern for several observers, 
as it was acknowledged that many people would have to walk the 5 km 
to the hub from Gbarnga city, sometimes accompanied by their 
children, including in the rainy season.  
There were nevertheless some advantages expected from co-locating 
various justice sector personnel at the hub. For example, the close 
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proximity of the Sexual and Gender Based Violence Crime Unit (see 
below) to the court is expected to facilitate more effective 
communication and coordination between the unit and court 
personnel. The benefits of co-locating justice personnel should be 
monitored once all justice actors are in place. Logistics-related 
constraints will also result from the fact that the regular LNP regional 
HQ will continue to be located in Gbarnga city, and the county prison is 
located outside the hub, again raising the perennial challenges of 
transportation between these venues and the justice facilities at the 
hub.  
What the hub does not, and perhaps cannot, address is the more 
systemic dysfunction of Liberia’s formal justice system and the 
widespread preference of citizens to resort to informal/customary 
justice providers. Liberia’s citizens face numerous challenges in 
accessing the formal justice system, not the least of which is pervasive 
lack of knowledge about that system. According to a survey of the three 
counties conducted in 2012, 85% of respondents declared that they 
knew very little or nothing about the Liberian justice system. Further, 
some 72% of respondents preferred using traditional justice methods 
(such as town or village chiefs) to resolve disputes over using the 
formal state courts and police.85  
While the overwhelming preference of citizens to use customary 
justice providers may in part be due to the general population not being 
widely familiar with the formal justice system, results from another 
Liberia-wide survey taken in late 2010 suggest that Liberians lack trust 
in judges and hold negative perceptions of the formal justice system. 
That survey reported 75% agreeing with the statement that ‘going to 
court is too expensive’, 44% agreeing that ‘going to court means you 
have to bribe the judges’, and only 23% agreeing that ‘judgements are 
the same for everyone.’ The same survey found that while only 32% of 
respondents thought accessing the formal court system was easy or 
very easy, 79% felt that it was easy or very easy to access the town or 
village chief for dispute resolution.86  
According to members of local community-based organisations, 
poor people do not have the means to pay the fees required to register a 
case with the police (this was reportedly about Liberian $2,000 or 
$3,000 at the time of research) or to see a court case through to its 
conclusion. There are also significant logistical and financial 
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challenges of getting a case to court in the countryside. All evidence, 
witnesses, and the victim must be present at the first hearing. This 
poses challenges due to the difficult terrain and sometimes the 
numbers of witnesses who must appear; one respondent described a 
case involving fatalities at a riot, in which the prosecution had 22 
witnesses and the defendant had 12. This requirement also imposes 
costs, often for the victim. Making four copies of each police case report 
(typically 17 pages or so) is required when a case goes to court, but 
police are allotted no budget for photocopying and must find the 
money to get the files photocopied commercially. In certain cases 
concerning SGBV, the LNP’s Women and Childrens Protection Service 
(WACPS) unit covers these costs, while in others the victim must 
provide the money in the form of fees. The imposition of informal fees 
to finance basic policing and justice services that are supposed to be 
provided as a public good to all Liberians means that many Liberians 
simply cannot afford to use the formal justice system. As stated to us by 
one female civil society activist near Gbarnga, in Liberia ‘there is no 
justice for the poor’. 
Due to overloaded court dockets and lack of adequate personnel, 
relatively few cases end up being heard in court. UNMIL estimates that 
only 8 per cent of cases are fully tried in Liberia.87 As a result, we heard 
that many victims of crimes are content to have the police apprehend a 
suspect, detain them for questioning and hold them in pre-trial 
detention. There is a very real possibility that a suspect may spend 
months in jail waiting for his or her case to be heard with the ultimate 
result that a case will be thrown out because it is not heard within the 
prescribed time limit, and the suspect released. For lack of a better and 
feasible alternative, we heard that this is accepted by some victims of 
crime as a form of justice. The acceptance in some instances may stem 
from ignorance of the justice process on the part of victims (believing 
that pre-trial detention means that the alleged perpetrator has been 
sent to jail as a custodial sentence, although it is really pre-trial 
detention), or may also be the result of a pragmatic acceptance that 
pre-trial detention of the accused is the best outcome they can hope for 
given the difficulties of seeing a court case through to the end.  
When a case is heard by a lower level magistrate court is deemed 
serious and progresses to the county’s circuit court, the odds of it being 
heard decrease due to the short court terms and extremely overloaded 
dockets of Liberia’s circuit courts. There is a single circuit court in 
Gbarnga for Bong County. The average length of a circuit court term is 
42 days, and there are four terms in a year, divided into two court 
sessions per year. The court closes for a month after each session. The 
court term is short, and Liberia lacks sufficient judges. Serious cases 
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concerning murder, rape, etc., take priority for the court and these also 
tend to be the most complex. We heard that in a single term, sometimes 
only two or three cases will be heard. As a result, the circuit court 
docket (calendar) is consistently overloaded. A recent survey of various 
Liberian circuit courts found them to have between 150 and 300 
docketed cases. In a 42-day term, three cases were typically heard, and 
in some instances a single case would extend beyond one court term.88 
One case alone recently took 68 days to resolve.89  
One of the improvements to the bottlenecks in the court system has 
been to increase the number of sitting circuit court judges. Whereas 
there was formerly only one circuit court judge per county, there are 
now two judges in circuit court, and there is reportedly a division of 
labour in that they focus on different types of cases to improve 
efficiency. There have also been efforts to increase the types of cases 
that can be heard in magistrate courts, and in October it was 
announced that through amendment of the Judiciary Law and Criminal 
Procedure Law, the jurisdiction of the magistrate courts would be 
widened. Whereas the jurisdiction of magistrate courts formerly 
extended only to infractions and petty larceny, the scope of their 
jurisdiction would henceforth include all first, second and third degree 
misdemeanour cases.90  
Another solution to justice challenges that Liberia is attempting to 
implement is the combination of customary and formal justice systems, 
as well as the introduction of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) for 
resolving smaller disputes and minor offences at the community level. 
Liberia National Police officers have referred minor issues to the 
customary justice system in which village, tribal and clan chiefs handle 
minor civil disputes, a procedure which is considered adequate and 
faster than the formal justice system.  
Grave offences (rape, aggravated assault, murder), however, must 
be dealt with as criminal offences under the formal justice system, and 
Liberian law prohibits customary justice providers from dealing with 
criminal offences. Nevertheless, we were informed that the court also 
does not go out ‘looking for’ cases; people must lodge a formal 
complaint in the case of a grave offence in order for the court to act. But 
this registering of complaints is often undermined by the financial 
costs imposed on victims as well as other barriers discussed above, and 
often victims simply cannot afford the various fees associated with 
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taking a case to court.91 In SGBV cases, an NGO representative 
recounted that victims and their families in Liberia are often reluctant 
to testify, especially if they are related to the perpetrator. Although we 
heard of efforts to raise awareness among people of the need to follow a 
case through to the end, victims are often reluctant to testify and often 
victims or their families appear satisfied to secure a settlement from the 
alleged perpetrator instead of registering a case and seeing it through 
the court.  
Corrections and rehabilitation 
One of the knock-on effects of insufficient court capacity and the 
backlog in the criminal justice process described above is an extremely 
high proportion of inmates who are held in Liberia’s prisons without 
being charged or tried. Pre-trial detainees constituted 78% of inmates 
of Liberia’s prisons in 2012.92 The backlog also has contributed to the 
severe overcrowding of Liberia’s prisons, particularly the main prison 
in Monrovia, which accounts for 50% of all prisoners in Liberia; 
although originally constructed with capacity to hold 350 prisoners, by 
October 2013 the Monrovia prison held 1,044 inmates.93  
The Gbarnga Central Prison is not physically located at the hub, but 
lies two kilometres from the hub on the road between the hub and 
Gbarnga city. There are 74 corrections and rehabilitation prison 
officials (including seven females) for this facility, which serves the 
three counties of Bong, Lofa and Nimba. The prison has a capacity to 
hold 143 inmates, including accommodation for 16 female inmates. In 
late June 2013, the prison housed 93 inmates in total, of which three 
were female. Female prisoners are separated from the male prisoner 
population, as are juveniles. Of the 93 prisoners, 21 had been 
convicted of crimes and were serving sentences, while the remainder 
were detainees still awaiting trial.94  Thus Gbarnga Central Prison’s 
pre-trial detainee rate comprising 77% of inmates closely reflects the 
national average cited above. Moreover, the snapshot figure from June 
2013 may indicate a decrease in the ratio of pre-trial detainees 
compared to the previous year, when a reported 106 out of 122 inmates 
were pre-trial detainees, or 87% of the prison population.95 This trend 
is only indicative however; pre-trial detention rates should be 
                                                          
91  Interview with Cornelius Flomo Wennah, County Prosecutor, Bong County, Gbarnga, 
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92  US State Department, Liberia Human Rights Report, 2012.  
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94  Interview with Feshell Deanor, Prison Superintendent, Gbarnga Central Prison, 21 
June 2013.  
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systematically tracked at Gbarnga Central Prison as well as other 
correctional facilities that will be linked to subsequent justice and 
security hubs. 
An initiative that may have contributed to the lowering of the pre-
trial detention rate in Gbarnga prison is the ‘fast-track court’ that takes 
place at the prison. Fast-track courts have been implemented in 
Liberia’s main prisons to release suspects whose pre-trial detention 
time has exceeded the legal limit. According to Section 18.2 of the 
Liberian Criminal Procedure Law, anyone accused of an indictable 
offence must be indicted and tried within two court terms, or be 
released. The fast-track court was initially implemented in Monrovia 
Central Prison, where over 700 pre-trial detainees were released in 
2012.96 The Gbarnga Central Prison has also introduced fast-track 
court proceedings, involving qualified justice personnel from the 
magisterial court who go to the prison to process and help clear the 
backlog of pre-trial detainees. However, the same logistical challenges 
affect the fast-track court as the regular court: if witnesses are unable 
or unwilling to appear when the case is heard, the case will be 
dismissed.97 
Probation was also introduced in Liberia as a partial measure to help 
address the problem of prison overcrowding. While probation existed 
on the books in Liberian law for many years, it was only introduced in 
practice in 2010, beginning with one-year pilot projects in Bong and 
Montserrado counties. With the development of the Gbarnga hub, the 
pilot phase came to an end and the regional probation service was 
located at the hub beginning in 2011. The hub hosts four probation 
officers and one administrator, who service the three counties of Bong, 
Lofa and Nimba, although they tend to focus on the Gbarnga area. 
Probation is possible for those who have committed minor and first 
time offences. It may involve restitution by paying back to the victim 
the damage caused by the crime, and through community service offers 
offenders the opportunity to reintegrate back into the community.  
Probation officers based at the Gbarnga hub have one motorbike at 
their disposal to go out into the local communities where individuals 
on probation are living to ensure that they are behaving and complying 
with the conditions of probation. Once every month, such visits are 
conducted to supervise offenders on probation. Through a strategy of 
‘collateral contact’ –  i.e. sensitising and working with chiefs, elders, 
youth leaders, and other influential members of the community  –  the 
probation officers also create an informal community network effect 
where, if the person on probation misbehaves, community members 
will be more likely to contact the probation officer. As of June 2013, 
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97  Interview with Feshell Deanor, Prison Superintendent, Gbarnga Central Prison, 21 
June 2013. 
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some 46 persons in Bong County had been on probation, 19 
undergoing community supervision at the time.98  
Although it is physically separated from the hub, Gbarnga Central 
Prison has benefited from infrastructure improvements that were 
undertaken as a direct result of hub development. Renovations were 
undertaken and a new medical clinic was created within the prison. 
The prison is visited several times per week by paramedics and a nurse, 
with medications being provided by the Ministry of Health. The 
building of the medical clinic was of particular importance in view of 
the lack of adequate transportatiion, which made it very difficult to 
transport detainees and prisoners who became ill to hospital. The 
building of the clinic in Gbarnga prison has been a very positive 
achievement of the hub initiative.  
Another improvement that we found in June 2013 was the feeding 
of inmates two times per day by the prison itself, where formerly 
according to reports from the preceding year they were fed only once 
per day.99 Local NGOs and the International Committee of the Red 
Cross have also advised prison authorities on improving conditions for 
prisoners, such as the suggestion to add more beans to meals for 
prisoners when meat is unavailable. The good condition of the prison 
was credited by one respondent to a very good head of prisons for the 
county, who had had previous professional experience running a 
prison in the United States. Compared to other post-conflict 
environments, the Gbarnga prison was said by this informed observer 
to be very well run, with exemplary conditions including the separate 
women’s and children’s facilities and prisoners’ access to fresh air. In 
his view, the prison constitutes the best component of justice and 
security connected to the Gbarnga hub.100 
Nevertheless, a continuing and serious problem with regard to the 
prison is the lack of transportation. At the time of field research, 
prisoners were still being escorted on foot between the court in 
Gbarnga city and the prison or by the one motorbike at the disposal of 
the prison. Prisoner escorts conducted on foot are potentially 
dangerous, carrying the risk of attacks on escorting officers and mob 
justice. Transport of detainees from the prison to court by motorcycle 
escort also poses obvious dangers to the escorting officer. These 
transportation challenges are expected to continue when the 
magisterial and circuit courts shift from Gbarnga city and begin to 
operate from the hub. 
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99  Kaneh, ‘Gbarnga Central Prison Overcrowded’. 
100 Interview with Michael Page, SSR Adviser, UNMIL, Monrovia, 27 June 2013. 
Marina Caparini 
 
42 
Another problem encountered at the Gbarnga prison is the lack of 
resources to provide skills training to inmates. Since hard-core 
criminals reside alongside minor offenders, the lack of work skills 
training, and particularly in a post-conflict environment where a 
generation of youth lacked formal education, means in practice that 
time spent incarcerated in prison can produce more serious and better 
skilled criminals. In this context, the probation program for minor and 
first-time offenders offers some rehabilitative prospects. Thus, while 
resource constraints continue to pose serious obstacles to the 
development of the criminal justice sector in Liberia, several positive 
developments can be seen at the Gbarnga prison and in the broader 
area of corrections in the region as a result of the hub initiative. 
Security and Justice for Women and Children 
The Gbarnga justice and security hub hosts the regional office of the 
Sexual and Gender-based Violence Crime Unit. As described to the 
team the SGBV Crime Unit is focused specifically on sexual violence – 
rape, gang rape, sexual assault, attempted rape and sodomy. The SGBV 
Crime Unit, with its head office in Monrovia, was first established and 
started prosecuting cases in 2009. The SGBV Crime Unit is a part of the 
prosecution arm of the Ministry of Justice, and the Unit is headed by the 
Chief Justice in Criminal Court E, which is Liberia’s special court for 
trying cases of SGBV. The Unit’s work centres on prosecution of cases, 
and it also seeks to ensure the provision of psycho-social support 
services to victims.  
The regional SGBV Crime Unit was established and began work at 
the Gbarnga hub in July 2012. The SGB Unit includes two Victim 
Support Officers (VSOs), who provide assistance to victims through 
linking them up with counselling, health and other services. The Unit 
also includes three Case Liaison Officers (CLOs), one for each of the 
counties covered by the hub, who seek to ensure that sufficient 
evidence is presented to prosecute cases, and who function as a bridge 
between lawyers at the court and the police. The CLOs’ immediate 
supervisor is their respective county attorney.101   
The Unit does not contain any police officers, but includes lawyers, 
people trained to investigate cases of SGBV, and people trained to 
provide support to victims. Activities include picking up and taking 
victims to the police, ensuring victims have food and clothing and 
other essential items, ensuring they receive medical care, and are 
provided counselling. The Unit also follows up cases with prosecution 
and defence counsels. The SGBV Crime Unit builds partnerships with 
court, police, those running safe houses, NGOs, and justice personnel. 
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The Unit interacts closely and on a daily basis with Liberia National 
Police officers who are working in the Women and Children Protection 
Section (WACPS) in the regional police headquarters in Gbarnga city. 
We heard that the SGBV Crime Unit at the hub is quick to react and is 
involved in most of the WACPS work, and police at the WACPS call the 
Unit for each new case of SGBV that is reported.102  
The research team heard that the SGBV Crime Unit also conducts 
outreach and training activities. Outreach to the community is done via 
radio talk shows, flyers, billboards and workshops. For example, we 
heard of a training workshop held in mid-June that was conducted by 
the SGBV Crime Unit on the guarding and preservation of evidence and 
interviewing of survivors. The workshop involved 45 participants from 
Bong, Lofa and Nimba counties, and importantly included some police 
officers who had not yet received training on how to preserve evidence 
in cases involving SGBV.   
The Gbarnga justice and security hub initiative provided the means 
to establish this Unit for the region on a permanent footing, and thus 
can be considered another positive outcome of the hub. However, there 
appeared to be a lack of information about how the SGBV Crime Unit 
functioned at the hub and in particular how victims of SGBV would 
access their services at the hub. One respondent described the ease 
with which victims of SGBV could walk into the WACPS, which are 
located at many police depots in Liberia including the regional LNP HQ 
in Gbarnga city, and contrasted this experience to the challenge of 
going to the hub located outside Gbarnga city, and gaining entrance to 
an imposing fenced and guarded facility, housing a bureaucracy about 
which little was publicly known. It was also suggested that more clarity 
was needed about procedures, and relationships between the SGBV 
Crime Unit and existing offices that are already providing support for 
SGBV victims outside the hub.103  
Other challenges involved constraints in terms of human resources 
(the SGBV Crime Unit at the Gbarnga hub have only five staff 
members), and the need for more resources, especially to improve their 
logistics. They need to be able to go to areas where they can get first-
hand information about SGBV cases, and ensure that lawyers have 
sufficient evidence to prosecute a case. Having adequate logistical 
capacities is vital since evidence can be compromised or lost if their 
response is delayed. We heard that although the SGBV Unit at the 
Gbarnga hub had one vehicle at its disposal, it was not functioning at 
the time.  
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We also heard of the often essential assistance provided by various 
NGOs to facilitate victim support and access to justice through activities 
as diverse as training paralegals to inform and support community 
members in the justice process, training members of justice and 
security sectors on SGBV, and providing transportation and social and 
material support services to victims.104 Various local NGOs and civil 
society groups in the Gbarnga hub area have filled numerous gaps in 
provision of justice and security delivery by the Liberian state actors 
who lack the means to properly carry out their functions. The 
Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), through its SGBV victim support 
services, conducts such essential services as transporting victims of 
SGBV to hospital and police. Community groups, such as women’s 
groups, monitor SGBV-related court cases and incarceration of those 
convicted of such crimes, and provide counselling and mediation to 
victims and their families in cases of domestic violence.  
Added to this is the support that UNMIL has provided to justice and 
security actors. We were told of an instance when UNMIL airlifted a 14 
year-old rape victim who was in critical condition to Monrovia. If 
UNMIL had not been present and willing to assist, it would have been 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to ensure that the victim received 
the necessary medical care.105 The UNMIL drawdown is being mirrored 
by some international NGOs by a similar transition and withdrawal 
strategy, raising real concerns about how essential services now being 
provided through this combination of actors will be provided in the 
future; even if the SGBV Crime Unit endeavours to investigate and 
provide support in cases of SGBV, their effectiveness will be limited if 
lacking adequate logistical resources.  
The creation of the SGBV Crime Unit (and the establishment of 
Special Court E to try SGBV crimes) was aimed at bolstering police and 
justice system responsiveness to gender-based crime. The broader 
reform context was informed by efforts to make the police both more 
responsive to the needs of women and more representative of the 
population through greater gender equity and recruitment of female 
officers. Although the LNP are not based out of the Gbarnga hub, one 
cannot assess the impact of the hub without taking into account how 
the operations of the LNP affect policing of SGBV. Two important 
developments should be noted. Conditions for female police officers 
were improved in a bid to improve female recruitment to 20% of police 
personnel. And a new unit, the Women and Children Protection Section 
(WACPS), patterned on a similar structure in the Sierra Leone police, 
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was created in 2005 in an effort to improve the responsiveness of the 
LNP to gender-based violence.106  
According to the Deputy Head of the Women and Children 
Protection Section (WACPS) at Liberia National Police (LNP) 
Headquarters in Monrovia, 75% of crimes reported to the Liberia 
National Police concern crimes against women and children.107 The 
WACPS was established in 2005 to deal with these crimes through five 
units, focusing on sexual assaults, domestic violence, crimes involving 
juveniles, human trafficking). While international donors have 
provided the WACPS with infrastructure and originally with vehicles, 
sustainability remains an concern. For example, WACPS originally was 
provided with five vehicles, but none were operational at the time we 
conducted our field trip. Funding for maintenance and upkeep of the 
vehicles appears to be missing. 
Another challenge is the high departure rate of LNP who have been 
trained to handle SGBV cases and hence work in WACPS, who 
subsequently apply for admittance into the PSU. The research team was 
informed by a WACPS manager at LNP Headquarters that of 245 male 
and female officers trained to investigate SGBV cases since the 
establishment of WACPS in 2005, less than 100 currently remained, 
primarily due to the attraction of the PSU and ERU. As noted above, 
members of the PSU and ERU are better paid than regular LNP, 
including WACPS officers. By 2014 an entry level WACPS officer made 
around the equivalent of $140 USD per month.108 Officers in other 
specialised units such as PSU made over $200 per month.109 The PSU 
and ERU have been recruiting more officers to build policing capacity 
as UNMIL draws down.   
Thus, while the establishment of the SGBV Crime Unit at the 
Gbarnga hub has brought real capacity and opportunities for improved 
coordination with other justice sector actors to prosecute cases and 
provide support to victims, systemic resourcing problems raise 
concerns for the ability of the Unit and related justice and security 
actors including the WACPS to operate effectively and sustainably. As 
UNMIL continues to draw down, international support from donors and 
NGOs services to combat SGBV are also likely to decline, raising the 
prospect of new gaps in service delivery. 
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 III.  Conclusions 
Assessment 
The implementation of the Gbarnga hub encountered repeated delays 
and difficulties, with problems relating to the lack of proper planning, 
and problems of design, coordination and the construction process. 
Despite the problems encountered in building the Gbarnga hub, and 
the largely untested assumptions about co-locating security and justice 
providers within a Liberian setting, by June 2013 the initiative brought 
several specific benefits to a context where public services have been 
severely under-resourced or absent. The hub initiative has resulted in 
the introduction or consolidation of new programmes or services to the 
region, including probation services based at the hub, fast-track court 
services, and the SGBV Crime Unit. It has been the impetus to forward-
base desperately needed security personnel (PSU and BPU) closer to 
the region, enabling a faster, albeit still limited, response to public 
disorder and border management contingencies in the leeward. The 
hub has resulted in the hiring of more corrections officers and the 
building of a health clinic at the Gbarnga regional prison. BPU 
undertake surveillance patrols at the border, and PSU are able to 
conduct confidence patrols and respond more quickly to LNP requests 
for backup, raising the profile of the Liberian state policing capacity in 
the region. The hub initiative has proven to be an effective vehicle for 
mobilising political attention, international and domestic funding, 
although it arguably may have diverted attention from other initiatives 
in the security and justice delivery domain.  
As discussed in the first section of this report, five hypotheses 
underpinned the planning and development of the Gbarnga justice and 
security hub. The first hypothesis -- that co-location will enhance 
collaboration among justice and security providers to improve service 
delivery -- has yet to be proven, and cannot be ascertained until all of 
the planned links of the criminal justice chain are present in the hub. 
At the time of our interviews in late June 2013, key justice services 
including the court system, prosecution and public defence were still 
missing from the hub. Co-location of key criminal justice service 
providers in a centralised location has been implemented in certain 
other settings, where it has been found to improve service delivery and 
enhance the efficiency of the system.110 However, given the very low 
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level of resourcing and scant presence of justice and security services in 
Liberia’s leeward, it is unclear whether the benefits of co-location 
would be similar to those in a developed, well-resourced context, and 
whether expected benefits of placing the service providers within close 
physical proximity would be offset by unexpected consequences of 
centralising those service providers in the inconveniently located hub. 
While it is too early to determine whether the full benefits of co-
location will be realised at Gbarnga hub, nevertheless it is clear that 
there are benefits in the sharing of the few vehicles at the disposal of 
the PSU and BPU. The co-location concept may eventually prove to 
have been well-grounded in regard to some facilitating communication 
and coordination among certain actors based at the Gbarnga hub 
(especially those involving the court system when it becomes 
operational). The actual impact of co-locating these actors should be 
closely tracked to determine whether this model should be pursued in 
future in similar contexts. Nevertheless, the hub also created 
challenges for the consumers of those services in terms of distance of 
those centralised services from the nearest large population centre, 
Gbarnga city. In the case of certain actors based at the hub, there is 
likely to be little apparent relevance or impact of their location on their 
working relations with other hub inhabitants – for example, the public 
outreach officer who deals with citizens and Monrovia-based complaint 
mechanisms. In terms of future hubs, one of the early lessons learned 
from the experience of the Gbarnga is a shift in emphasis from 
infrastructure development to prioritising service delivery.111 
Consequently, co-location of service providers will likely also be de-
emphasised for future hubs.   
The second hypothesis held that the hubs would help to decentralise 
justice and security services, initially by deploying more service 
providers from Monrovia to the under-served leeward regions. A 2012 
‘baseline survey’ conducted while the hub was still being built asked 
respondents about their perceptions of the regional hub. An 
overwhelming majority reportedly agreed or strongly agreed with the 
statements that the concept of the regional hub ‘creates access to 
decentralized justice’ and ‘creates sense of justice and security’.112 It is 
important to note however that at the time the perceptions survey was 
administered, the hub was not yet complete and was offering few 
services. It is likely then that the perceptions of the region’s inhabitants 
reflected more their expectations surrounding the idea of the hub than 
perceptions of its actual operation. The survey nevertheless established 
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a baseline, which will be useful to help measure changes in public 
perceptions once the hub becomes operational. 
The Gbarnga hub has today achieved a ‘thin’ notion of 
decentralisation, although the ‘thicker’ notion has yet to be seen. 
Decentralisation is viewed as a means of empowering citizens, 
particularly those who have been excluded or marginalised in public 
life. Decentralisation is linked to increased public participation and 
inclusion in systems of governance. It is not merely a technical process, 
but has a political character. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
has noted that decentralisation is used in Liberia in two ways: ‘true 
decentralisation’ which entails the devolution of political and decision-
making power to locally-elected officials, and what is known as 
‘deconcentration’, which gives decision-making power to officials 
stationed at the local level but appointed from the centre.113 
Deconcentration ‘tends to extend the scope or reach of central 
government and to strengthen its authority by moving executive 
agencies controlled by the centre down to lower levels in the political 
system’. With deconcentration, the central government retains its 
authority, and merely relocates its officers in different areas or levels 
within the national territory.114 In contrast, devolution ‘cedes control 
of such agencies and resources to political actors and institutions at 
lower levels. It is always a form of power-sharing between central 
government and sub-national authorities.’115 Devolution implies 
legally defined areas of competence and taxation.  
The use of ‘decentralisation’ with regard to the hubs is somewhat 
ambiguous and it is more accurate to describe what the hub has in part 
achieved as ‘deconcentration’, or building up regional capacity by 
creating more infrastructure and sending more security personnel to 
the countryside. Thus far, the Gbarnga hub remains an exercise in 
deconcentration of administrative authority; basic public security 
policy and budgetary allocation decisions continue to be made by 
central ministries in Monrovia. Decentralisation, in the sense of the 
devolution of decision-making authority and budget allocation 
authority, is not mentioned as part of the hub and is, in the view of 
certain respondents, many years away.  
In order for real decentralisation to take place, local authorities will 
need to be delegated more authority and responsibility in key areas 
including security and justice, with the objective of making those areas 
of state responsibility more inclusive and more responsive to local 
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needs. This includes participation of local communities and authorities 
in governance structures, as well as in community or public oversight 
mechanisms for police, offering them the opportunity to participate in 
or influence planning, budgeting, implementation and accountability 
decisions.  
The third hypothesis underlying the hub concept was that they 
would help create physical presence of the Liberian state and more 
security in the outlying regions as UNMIL draws down. This is being 
partly achieved through the PSU forward-basing and confidence 
patrols. However the underlying problem, lack of sufficient regular LNP 
throughout the countryside is exacerbated by the logistical challenges 
and personnel shortages resulting from by a long-engrained pattern of 
low levels of resourcing for public services outside of Monrovia and 
structural disincentives that make rotations to the leeward 
unattractive, if not financially untenable, to many Liberian police 
officers. Moreover, the push to increase LNP presence throughout the 
country and the advantages enjoyed by specialised PSU and ERU 
officers draws off qualified and trained officers from less privileged yet 
essential units like the WACPS. While extension of state authority will 
remain an objective as UNMIL continues to draw down its forces, 
awareness of these unintended consequences might suggest, for 
example, that WACPS officers, as a specialised unit, are not paid poorly 
relative to ERU or PSU officers and that those based in the leeward 
would benefit from similar opportunities for professional development 
as Monrovia-based officers. 
Fourthly, the hub was developed on the assumption that the 
accountability of justice and security providers would improve if the 
hub made it easier for the public to register complaints. The Gbarnga 
hub is contributing to accountability of justice and security providers in 
the form of a public outreach officer who is based at the hub to receive 
public complaints about personnel and convey those complaints to the 
appropriate mechanism for follow-up. Region-wide monitoring of 
complaints deposited and resolved, both before and after the 
establishment of the hub, should provide clearer indication of the 
impact of the mechanism.  While raising awareness among Liberians of 
the mechanisms for lodging complaints against justice and security 
actors is a positive development, and facilitating the processing of 
those complaints through the outreach officer is an achievement, we 
received no information on whether there were commensurate efforts 
to improve actual police and judicial accountability and oversight 
mechanisms, whether via the investigation of complaints, enforcement 
and disciplinary measures, or parliamentary oversight. While putting 
in place a public point of contact for justice and security complaint 
mechanisms is a useful first step, the more fundamental challenge 
resides in creating more effective and enforced internal and external 
oversight mechanisms to hold justice and security actors to account, 
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including through the creation of local community oversight 
committees. 
The fifth hypothesis held that the hub would strengthen cooperation 
and relationships between those justice and security actors operating 
from the hub on the one hand, and community-based services on the 
other. The impact of the Gbarnga hub on coordination with local 
community groups and NGOs was not evident at the time of the field 
research and there should be ongoing monitoring to determine how 
hub actors are facilitating a more community-driven approach to 
justice and security provision. Representatives of numerous smaller 
communities and community-based groups in the Gbarnga region 
appeared at that time to have little information on the hub, suggesting 
a need for greater outreach and public information. 
In Liberia the public goods of security and justice are not delivered 
only (or even primarily) by the state, but through the combination of 
means of various actors and institutions. The co-existence of formal 
state and customary or non-state providers constitutes a hybrid system 
of justice and security. While this report has discussed the effort to 
strengthen the delivery by public actors, their reach is very limited in 
the leeward. Where state actors exist to offer security and justice 
services, other non-state actors, such as NGOs, community groups, 
village chiefs and elders, ‘big men’ and other private citizens may play 
critical roles in supplementing and facilitating those services. While 
various NGOs and civil society groups are filling gaps in justice and 
security delivery, these are not a viable long-term substitute for state 
capacity to provide basic public services to its population. UNMIL’s 
transition and move towards withdrawal has been echoed in the 
planned and actual withdrawal of a number of international NGOs who 
define themselves as providing humanitarian assistance. It is unclear 
who, if anyone, will step in to provide the essential services that they 
are currently providing to fill the gaps in state provision of justice and 
security. The withdrawal of such NGOs threatens to reopen the critical 
gaps in service delivery to the local population, and raises questions 
about the sustainability of hub-based formal services.  
Recommendations 
Some important lessons appear to have been learned by those involved 
in planning of the future hubs. The Gbarnga hub experience to date has 
apparently resulted in a shift in emphasis to prioritising service 
delivery over infrastructure development. Efforts will focus on 
upgrading existing infrastructure for subsequent hubs in preference to 
investing in the development of new infrastructure. Future hubs will 
also not likely locate Border Patrol Units at the hub, but deploy them 
closer to or at the border. As such, the meaning of the ‘hub’ has 
apparently evolved from its original literal sense as a physical 
concentration of infrastructure and co-location of service providers, 
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and becoming, through trial and error, a more figurative notion 
referring to a coordinated strategy and a concentration of efforts to 
build up existing relevant services within a region. There has been little 
discussion of this shift and future hubs would benefit from a more open 
discussion of how to optimally support, coordinate and find synergies 
in service delivery across justice and security actors in the remaining 
regions.  
The location of the Gbarnga hub suggests another lesson to be 
learned. Many respondents felt it is too far from Gbarnga city, lying 5 
km from the town and accessible by an unpaved road. Clients/users of 
the hub would need to find a means of transportation (motorbike taxi 
or car taxi), or more likely, walk to the hub. They are often likely to be 
accompanied by their children. Logistical challenges also arise for 
providers of services, given the lack of vehicles, to respond to incidents 
and to carry out duties involved in the delivery of justice or security, 
such as the transportation of victims, alleged perpetrators, witnesses 
and evidence. Other respondents believe that the hub is a manageable 
distance, and that over time Gbarnga city would develop towards the 
hub, through its stimulation of development in the areas surrounding 
the hub. As the full range of justice and security services become 
operational from the hub, access of citizens of Lofa, Nimba and Bong 
counties should be closely monitored, and remaining barriers to access 
addressed. In the short- to medium-term, the distance of the hub from 
the city would appear to pose significant logistical challenges, though 
this may well change over time. A question to be asked for planning 
and development of future hubs might be whether in each of the 
specific regional contexts it is more important to improve immediate 
access to services for the largest number of citizens, or whether a 
longer-term perspective is merited. 
Moreover, while the hub initiative has so far produced some tangible 
advances in extending state presence in the leeward, systemic 
problems continue to afflict public security and access to justice for the 
inhabitants of Bong, Lofa and Nimba counties and in Liberia more 
widely. Thus, while the forward deployment of 51 PSU officers to 
Gbarnga appears to have improved security and public perceptions of 
security through quicker response capacity and through confidence 
patrols, these benefits remain limited because the PSU lacks sufficient 
mobility, with only one vehicle available for the PSU at the hub. There 
remain insufficient regular Liberia National Police officers deployed 
throughout region, and those who are present are under-resourced and 
poorly paid. The lack of adequate budgetary resources results in 
underequipped police – lacking vehicles but also basic office 
infrastructure, equipment and supplies in the rural areas – and hence 
impairs the capacity of regular LNP to perform basic functions, 
responding to and investigating crimes and insecurity in the 
community. Future planning of hubs should take into account these 
more systemic problems in the policing and justice sectors.   
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More fundamentally, people are being excluded from justice and 
security services in the Gbarnga hub region and throughout Liberia 
because of structural problems relating to weak presence of the 
relevant public service personnel and infrastructure, and how those 
few police and court officials who are present function in an 
environment of severe budgetary shortfalls. As described above, 
informal ‘fees’ are frequently imposed by police and/or court officials 
on victims in order to register a complaint, have an alleged crime 
investigated, and have a court case pursued. In other words, Liberians 
who have been victims of crime are required to pay fees at virtually 
every step of the criminal justice process. These fees may go to 
supplement the low income of police and court officials (petty 
corruption), and may be used to cover the costs associated with 
carrying out the basic policing and criminal justice duties, such as fuel 
and transportation costs to transport police or alleged perpetrators, or 
photocopying police reports for the preparation and hearing of court 
cases. In such a context, where the user of state policing and justice 
services must in practice finance part of the delivery of the service, 
those who cannot afford the fees are in practice denied the services. 
Potential users may also self-exclude, preferring to rely on customary 
and traditional providers of justice and security services, whether 
through lack of information, lack of trust or confidence in the formal 
system, or lack of means to pay the fees associated with the formal 
system. The widespread preference across Liberia and other sub-
Saharan African states for customary and traditional providers suggest 
that the hub initiative and other efforts to extend state authority should 
seek to find more ways to work with informal systems to ensure justice 
and security needs of citizens are being met. 
More also could have been done to gauge the security and justice 
needs of the populations of the three counties before planning and 
implementation of the first hub had commenced. The development and 
implementation of the hub appears in practice to have been largely top-
down. While community activists and leaders of civil society 
organisations around Gbarnga seemed somewhat informed, our 
impressions were that either few people in the general population were 
aware of the intended functions of the hub, or it was vaguely described 
as a ‘barracks’ for police. Similarly, while certain NGO staff who were 
active in providing or supporting security and justice services were 
aware of the hub, others had vague or partial understandings. A 
number of ordinary citizens who we met were unaware of the hub, and 
had not been involved in the perception survey or engaged before or 
during the construction of the hub. We also heard from Gbarnga area 
respondents that well educated Liberians, such as students at the 
university, were largely uninformed about the hub. Effective public 
outreach will be critical once the hub is completed and all planned 
services become operational. For future hubs, public needs 
assessments should be undertaken much earlier in the planning and 
development process. Public outreach, awareness-raising and 
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communications efforts about the functions of the hub need to be 
increased as improvements to services are implemented.  
The stated objective of the hub to improve service delivery not only 
implies attention to the presence and performance of local justice and 
security providers, but also increasing accountability of those actors to 
the people whom they serve – the population within their area of 
responsibility. Improving accountability should focus not only on 
creating a mechanism to facilitate, but on improving actual oversight 
and accountability procedures for the state’s justice and security sector 
personnel.  
Since the field research for this report was conducted, the Liberian 
government has also decided to arm regular Liberia National Police 
located at depots and stations throughout the country, in response to 
rising incidences of vigilante and mob violence. This marks a departure 
from the model of policing implemented over the past 11 years. The 
impact of this decision – for crime prevention and response as well as 
for community perceptions of regular LNP officers – should be closely 
monitored and the implications for the wider criminal justice system 
assessed. There are valid concerns of police and border control officers 
who must respond to crimes committed by armed individuals. However 
similar proposals to arm BIN officers at the Liberian borders have 
provoked concerns by local communities of greater potential for 
harassment by security forces, particularly of women.116 Measures to 
arm LNP and BIN officers must be undertaken alongside parallel efforts 
to strengthen professionalism, effective disciplinary procedures and 
accountability for misconduct. 
Finally, it is not clear how sustainable the hub will be once the 
infrastructure is completed and, as UNMIL draws down and eventually 
withdraws, the attention of the international community declines. 
Recent Government of Liberia promises to allocate extra funding to 
security and justice services are an encouraging sign, but must be 
implemented and sustained over the medium- to long-term if the 
opportunity to improve local security and justice delivery that is 
presented by the hub initiative will realise its potential. Those involved 
in future hub development should seek to instrumentalise the hubs’ 
mobilising potential to attract attention and resources to improving 
security and justice service delivery in the leeward, and better ensure 
sustainability over the medium term. This would mean maintaining an 
open and transparent process of learning, planning and 
implementation so that the lessons of the hub initiative can be widely 
observed and, if merited, adopted elsewhere. 
                                                          
116  ‘Summary of the visit of H.E. Mr. Staffan Tillander’, Para 38. 
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